The frequent occurrence of drought–flood abrupt alternation (DFAA) in Huaibei Plain has shown a great impact on local rice production. Pot experiments were performed in 2016–2018 to investigate the effects of co-occurring drought and flooding stresses on dry weight (DW), grain yield, nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K) uptake and use efficiencies (NUE, PUE and KUE) in rice. The results showed that DFAA changed the accumulation of biomass and nutrients among different organs in rice. Compared with control, DFAA significantly reduced the grain yield (−29.8%) and root DW (−30.0%), but increased the DW in stem and leaf (10.2% and 9.7%). The root/shoot ratio and morphological size of the root system in DFAA-treated plants was smaller than those of drought alone and flooding alone. Under DFAA stresses, the specific absorption rate of N, P and K increased significantly (47.9%, 31.8% and 32.8%, respectively), while NUE, PUE and KUE decreased significantly (−27.9%, −10.8% and −19.7%, respectively). The decrease of nutrient use efficiencies was mainly due to the redundant growth of branches and leaves, and the key factor limiting grain yield under DFAA conditions was the effective utilization of N. Compared with the earlier drought, the subsequent flooding might have more influence on rice growth, nutrient utilization and yield formation, but the interaction of the two weakened the cumulative effect of drought and flooding. These findings provide a scientific basis for establishing a nutrient and water management system of rice cultivation under transient soil moisture conditions.

Hedging is widely used to mitigate severe water shortages in the operation of reservoirs during droughts. Rationing is usually instituted with one hedging policy, which is based only on one trigger, i.e., initial storage level or current water availability. It may perform poorly in balancing the benefits of a release during the current period versus those of carryover storage during future droughts. This study proposes a novel hedging rule to improve the efficiency of a reservoir operated to supply water, in which, based on two triggers, hedging is initiated with three different hedging sub-rules through a two-step approach. In the first step, the sub-rule is triggered based on the relationship between the initial reservoir storage level and the level of the target rule curve or the firm rule curve at the end of the current period. This step is mainly concerned with increasing the water level or not in the current period. Hedging is then triggered under the sub-rule based on current water availability in the second step, in which the trigger implicitly considers both initial and ending reservoir storage levels in the current period. Moreover, the amount of hedging is analytically derived based on the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. In addition, the hedging parameters are optimized using the improved particle swarm optimization (IPSO) algorithm coupled with a rule-based simulation. A single water-supply reservoir located in Hubei Province in central China is selected as a case study. The operation results show that the proposed rule is reasonable and significantly improves the reservoir operation performance for both long-term and critical periods relative to other operation policies, such as the standard operating policy (SOP) and the most commonly used hedging rules.

Cooperative and self-enforceable water allocation is a key instrument to manage geopolitical conflict induced by water scarcity, which necessitates the cooperative willingness of the agents and considers their heterogeneity in geography, climate, hydrology, environment and social economy. Based on a multi-indicator system that contains asymmetric information on water volume contribution, current water consumption, water economic efficiency and efforts for eco-environmental protection, this study proposed a water allocation framework by combining the asymmetric power index approach with bankruptcy theory for solving the transboundary water allocation problem under scarcity. The proposed method was applied to the Yellow River Basin in northern China, which is mainly shared by nine provincial districts and frequently suffers from severe water shortages, and its results were compared with six alternative methods. The results highlight the necessity of quantifying agents’ willingness to cooperate under the condition of asymmetric negotiation power when making decisions on transboundary water allocations. The proposed method allows for transboundary water allocations through simultaneous consideration of the agent’s willingness to cooperate and asymmetric negotiation power, as well as disagreement allocation points, which ensure the stability, fairness and self-enforceability of allocation results. Therefore, it can offer practical and valuable decision-making insights for transboundary water management under water scarcity.

Cooperative and self-enforceable water allocation is a key instrument to manage geopolitical conflict induced by water scarcity, which necessitates concerning the cooperative willingness of the agents and considering their heterogeneity in geography, climate, hydrology, environment and social economy. Based on a multi-indicator system that contains asymmetric information on water volume contribution, current water consumption, water economic efficiency and efforts for eco-environmental protection, this study proposed a water allocation framework by combining the asymmetric power index approach with bankruptcy theory for solving the transboundary water allocation problem under scarcity. The proposed method was applied to the Yellow River Basin in northern China, which is mainly shared by nine provincial districts and frequently suffers from severe water shortage, and its results were compared with six alternative methods. The results highlight the necessity of quantifying agent’s willingness to cooperate under the background of asymmetric negotiation power when making decisions on transboundary water allocations. The proposed method allows to perform transboundary water allocations through simultaneous consideration of the agent’s cooperation willingness, asymmetric negotiation power as well as disagreement allocation points, which ensure the stability, fairness and self-enforceability of allocation results. Therefore, it can offer practical and valuable decision-making insights for transboundary water management under water scarcity.

Managing trans-jurisdictional water scarcity conflicts is a thorny task, as it is usually challenged by multiple institutionally independent decision-making agents, which requires developing cooperative and self-enforcing solutions. This study proposed a decision-making method that combines fairness and stability concerns to solve trans-jurisdictional water allocation conflicts under scarcity. Based on the water allocation alternatives yielded by seven bankruptcy rules, the Gini coefficient and Shapley–Shubik power index were used to separately quantify their fairness and stability criteria from distributive justice and individual-level acceptability, and then game theory was employed to integrate the quantitative results of the two criteria to make final water allocation decisions. The decision-making method was applied to the Hanjiang River Basin of Hubei Province in China under two water scarcity scenarios, which is shared by ten city-level jurisdictions. Numerical results indicate that bankruptcy rules are considered practical for performing trans-jurisdictional water allocations under scarcity, but their realistic eligibility should be investigated before implementation. An apparent trade-off between fairness and stability exists among the water allocation alternatives, and there exists room for identifying compromise alternatives; the constrained equal losses and adjusted proportional rules are identified as the preferred rule by the proposed decision-making method for allocating water resources in the Hanjiang River Basin of Hubei Province, respectively, in dry and extremely dry years. The findings highlight the necessity and significance of balancing fairness and stability criteria in managing trans-jurisdictional water scarcity conflicts, and the proposed method has proved to be an effective decision-making tool to facilitate negotiation over trans-jurisdictional water allocations under scarcity.