Guangjing Wang

Dr. Guangjing Wang

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2024 in arXiv
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BCBocheng Chen
Bocheng Chen
Hanqing GuoHanqing Guo
Hanqing Guo
GWGuangjing Wang
Guangjing Wang
YWYuanda Wang
Yuanda Wang
QYQiben Yan
Qiben Yan
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated great capabilities in natural language understanding and generation, largely attributed to the intricate alignment process using human feedback. While alignment has become an essential training component that leverages data collected from user queries, it inadvertently opens up an avenue for a new type of user-guided poisoning attacks. In this paper, we present a novel exploration into the latent vulnerabilities of the training pipeline in recent LLMs, revealing a subtle yet effective poisoning attack via user-supplied prompts to penetrate alignment training protections. Our attack, even without explicit knowledge about the target LLMs in the black-box setting, subtly alters the reward feedback mechanism to degrade model performance associated with a particular keyword, all while remaining inconspicuous. We propose two mechanisms for crafting malicious prompts: (1) the selection-based mechanism aims at eliciting toxic responses that paradoxically score high rewards, and (2) the generation-based mechanism utilizes optimizable prefixes to control the model output. By injecting 1\% of these specially crafted prompts into the data, through malicious users, we demonstrate a toxicity score up to two times higher when a specific trigger word is used. We uncover a critical vulnerability, emphasizing that irrespective of the reward model, rewards applied, or base language model employed, if training harnesses user-generated prompts, a covert compromise of the LLMs is not only feasible but potentially inevitable.

31 October 2024 in arXiv
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CZCe Zhou
Ce Zhou
QYQiben Yan
Qiben Yan
DKDaniel Kent
Daniel Kent
GWGuangjing Wang
Guangjing Wang
WDWeikang Ding
Weikang Ding
HRHayder Radha
Hayder Radha
Monocular Depth Estimation (MDE) is a pivotal component of vision-based Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, enabling vehicles to estimate the depth of surrounding objects using a single camera image. This estimation guides essential driving decisions, such as braking before an obstacle or changing lanes to avoid collisions. In this paper, we explore vulnerabilities of MDE algorithms in AD systems, presenting LensAttack, a novel physical attack that strategically places optical lenses on the camera of an autonomous vehicle to manipulate the perceived object depths. LensAttack encompasses two attack formats: concave lens attack and convex lens attack, each utilizing different optical lenses to induce false depth perception. We first develop a mathematical model that outlines the parameters of the attack, followed by simulations and real-world evaluations to assess its efficacy on state-of-the-art MDE models. Additionally, we adopt an attack optimization method to further enhance the attack success rate by optimizing the attack focal length. To better evaluate the implications of LensAttack on AD, we conduct comprehensive end-to-end system simulations using the CARLA platform. The results reveal that LensAttack can significantly disrupt the depth estimation processes in AD systems, posing a serious threat to their reliability and safety. Finally, we discuss some potential defense methods to mitigate the effects of the proposed attack.