Luis H. Favela

Dr. Luis H. Favela

Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences Program, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816, USA
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 June 2023 in Frontiers in Psychology
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Luis H. FavelaLuis H. Favela
Luis H. Favela
EMEdouard Machery
Edouard Machery
The concept of representation is commonly treated as indispensable to research on brains, behavior, and cognition. Nevertheless, systematic evidence about the ways the concept is applied remains scarce. We present the results of an experiment aimed at elucidating what researchers mean by “representation.” Participants were an international group of psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers (N = 736). Applying elicitation methodology, participants responded to a survey with experimental scenarios aimed at invoking applications of “representation” and five other ways of describing how the brain responds to stimuli. While we find little disciplinary variation in the application of “representation” and other expressions (e.g., “about” and “carry information”), the results suggest that researchers exhibit uncertainty about what sorts of brain activity involve representations or not; they also prefer non-representational, causal characterizations of the brain’s response to stimuli. Potential consequences of these findings are explored, such as reforming or eliminating the concept of representation from use.

11 February 2020 in WIREs Cognitive Science
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Luis H. FavelaLuis H. Favela
Luis H. Favela

24 September 2020 in Synthese
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Luis H. FavelaLuis H. Favela
Luis H. Favela
Although there is a substantial philosophical literature on dynamical systems theory in the cognitive sciences, the same is not the case for neuroscience. This paper attempts to motivate increased discussion via a set of overlapping issues. The first aim is primarily historical and is to demonstrate that dynamical systems theory is currently experiencing a renaissance in neuroscience. Although dynamical concepts and methods are becoming increasingly popular in contemporary neuroscience, the general approach should not be viewed as something entirely new to neuroscience. Instead, it is more appropriate to view the current developments as making central again approaches that facilitated some of neuroscience’s most significant early achievements, namely, the Hodgkin–Huxley and FitzHugh–Nagumo models. The second aim is primarily critical and defends a version of the “dynamical hypothesis” in neuroscience. Whereas the original version centered on defending a noncomputational and nonrepresentational account of cognition, the version I have in mind is broader and includes both cognition and the neural systems that realize it as well. In view of that, I discuss research on motor control as a paradigmatic example demonstrating that the concepts and methods of dynamical systems theory are increasingly and successfully being applied to neural systems in contemporary neuroscience. More significantly, such applications are motivating a stronger metaphysical claim, that is, understanding neural systems asbeing dynamical systems, which includes not requiring appeal to representations to explain or understand those phenomena. Taken together, the historical claim and the critical claim demonstrate that the dynamical hypothesis is undergoing a renaissance in contemporary neuroscience.

26 July 2013 in Ecological Psychology
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MRMarieke M. J. W. van Rooij
Marieke M. J. W. van Rooij
Luis H. FavelaLuis H. Favela
Luis H. Favela
MMMaryLauren Malone
MaryLauren Malone
MRMichael J. Richardson
Michael J. Richardson
Individuals make decisions under uncertainty every day. Decisions are based on incomplete information concerning the potential outcome or the predicted likelihood with which events occur. In addition, individuals' choices often deviate from the rational or mathematically objective solution. Accordingly, the dynamics of human decision making are difficult to capture using conventional, linear mathematical models. Here, we present data from a 2-choice task with variable risk between sure loss and risky loss to illustrate how a simple nonlinear dynamical system can be employed to capture the dynamics of human decision making under uncertainty (i.e., multistability, bifurcations). We test the feasibility of this model quantitatively and demonstrate how the model can account for up to 86% of the observed choice behavior. The implications of using dynamical models for explaining the nonlinear complexities of human decision making are discussed as well as the degree to which the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems might offer an alternative framework for understanding human decision making processes.

27 July 2020 in Philosophy Compass
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Luis H. FavelaLuis H. Favela
Luis H. Favela

11 November 2021 in Cognitive Science
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Luis H. FavelaLuis H. Favela
Luis H. Favela
Mary Jean AmonMary Jean Amon
Mary Jean Amon
LLLorena Lobo
Lorena Lobo
ACAnthony Chemero
Anthony Chemero
We present an empirically supported theoretical and methodological framework for quantifying the system‐level properties of person‐plus‐tool interactions in order to answer the question: “Are person‐plus‐tool‐systems extended cognitive systems?” Nineteen participants provided perceptual judgments regarding their ability to pass through apertures of various widths while using visual information, blindfolded wielding a rod, or blindfolded wielding an Enactive Torch—a vibrotactile sensory‐substitution device for detecting distance. Monofractal, multifractal, and recurrence quantification analyses were conducted to assess features of person‐plus‐tool movement dynamics. Trials where people utilized the rod or Enactive Torch demonstrated stable “self‐similarity,” or indices of healthy and adaptive single systems, regardless of aperture width, trial order, features of the participants’ judgments, and participant characteristics. Enactive Torch trials exhibited a somewhat greater range of dynamic fluctuations than the rod trials, as well as less movement recurrence, suggesting that the Enactive Torch allowed for more exploratory movements. Findings provide support for the notion that person‐plus‐tool systems can be classified as extended cognitive systems and a framework for quantifying system‐level properties of these systems. Implications concerning future research on extended cognition are discussed.