Getaneh Awulachew Zimbele

Mr. Getaneh Awulachew Zimbele

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 September 2024 in Research Square
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GZGetaneh Awulachew Zimbele
Getaneh Awulachew Zimbele
SDSamuel Asferaw Demilew
Samuel Asferaw Demilew
Data security is that the primary concern of every individual and organization. To assure the security of data, cryptography is the prime mechanism. RSA is most widely accepted as a reliable asymmetric key cryptography. Since, its reliability depends on the hardness of factoring large common modulus which is accessible for the public, this accessibility of the common modulus could exposed RSA to various cryptanalysis attacks: Shor’s quantum polynomial-time algorithm, D-Wave quantum computer attacks, double encryption attack, and low private exponent attack. To address this weaknesses, this paper proposes an asymmetric key cryptosystem named as Double Key Pair and Hidden Modulus RSA (DKPHM-RSA) which introduces additional key pair, and the public mask modulus which is a pseudo random masking number derived from real modulus. Replacing the second real modulus, this derived public mask modulus is introduced in a second public key component; as a result, a second real modulus kept hidden from the public unlike the case in RSA. To improve data security, additional public key exponent along with public mask modulus are used for second encryption while additional private key with additional real modulus is used for the first decryption process. For performance analysis Net bean IDE 8.2 is used, and the proposed DKPHM-RSA algorithm is compared with state-of-the-art algorithms: RSA, ESRKGS, HRM-RSA, and MRSA based on key generation speed, encryption speed, decryption speed, time complexity, resistance to attacks, and avalanche effect. The performance analysis shows that DKPHM-RSA is less complex and highly secured than state-of-the-art algorithms. It improves key generation speed of ESRKGS, and MRSA by 298%, 31%; encryption time of RSA, ESRKGS, MRSA, HRM-RSA by 34%, 263%, 1331%, 33%; decryption speed of ESRKGS, MRSA by 51%, 404%, respectively.

4 November 2025 in Research Square
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TATeamerat M. Asres
Teamerat M. Asres
GZGetaneh Awulachew Zimbele
Getaneh Awulachew Zimbele
TKTewodros M. Kifle
Tewodros M. Kifle
Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) attacks can be classified into active and passive attacks. Among active attacks, the rushing attack is one of the basic network layer attacks. In MANET, it early exploits the duplicate suppression mechanism of Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) protocol by quickly forwarding the RREQ packet to neighboring nodes without processing it, to influence a source node to include the rushed node in its route, which leads to data loss when transmitting the data packet to the correct destination node. This Early Rushing Attack Detection and Prevention in AODV MANETs (E-RADP) paper is proposed to fill this gap.To advance the security of our proposed algorithm, threshold value, ratio, and intermediate delay are introduced in rushing attack detection and prevention processes. For the performance analysis, the network simulator NS2.35 is used. The proposed protocol is compared with AODV, Prevention of Multiple Rushing Attacks Using AODV Routing Protocol (PMRA), and Rushing Attack Prevention with modified AODV (MAODV) based on true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative values of normal and malicious nodes, and throughput, packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay. E-RADP improves the rushing attack detection rate (DR), throughput, and packet loss rate (PLR) of existing protocols. It also improves the end-to-end delay (E2ED) of existing protocols when a rushing node is present in a MANET. Thus, the performance analysis shows that E-RADP is highly secure and faster than existing algorithms. We make the codes, and data for our E-RADP publicly available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15475513.