Randall Holcombe

Dr. Randall Holcombe

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

33Years (1994-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 June 2015 in Public Choice
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RHRandall Holcombe
Randall Holcombe
CBChristopher J. Boudreaux
Christopher J. Boudreaux

18 September 2012 in Planning Theory
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RHRandall Holcombe
Randall Holcombe
Sometimes planning is designed to counteract market forces, revealing an adversarial relationship between planning and the invisible hand. Other times, planning builds on the spontaneous order of the market and the two will be allies. This article offers two related arguments on the division between top-down planning and the bottom-up planning produced by the spontaneous order of the market. First, planning as a whole has insufficiently appreciated both the effectiveness of the spontaneous order of the market and the difficulty of overriding it. Second, when one recognizes the way in which bottom-up planning creates an orderly outcome, one can see that governments have simultaneously planned too much of the affairs of market participants, but at the same time have insufficiently planned their own activities.

15 June 2013 in Public Choice
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RHRandall Holcombe
Randall Holcombe
CBChristopher J. Boudreaux
Christopher J. Boudreaux

24 October 2018 in Economies
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RHRandall Holcombe
Randall Holcombe
Constitutional political economy has focused heavily on designing constitutional rules sufficient to constrain governmental power. More attention has been devoted to designing rules that are effective constraints than on the institutions that would be required to enforce them. One problem is that rules are interpreted and enforced by the political elite, who tend to interpret and enforce them in ways that favor their interests over those of the masses. Democratic oversight is ineffective because voters realize they have no influence over public policy, and are therefore rationally ignorant. A system of checks and balances within government is necessary for enforcing constitutional constraints because it divides power among elites with competing interests and enables one group of elites to check the power of others. Checks and balances within governmental institutions are necessary to constrain the government from abusing its power.

1 September 2003 in The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics
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RHRandall Holcombe
Randall Holcombe

6 May 2008 in Public Choice
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RHRandall Holcombe
Randall Holcombe