After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, social media become the major contested field for both sides. Social bots are widely involved in the Russia-Ukraine war discussion as communication actors. However, how social bots build the war agenda has not been well answered. This study explores the role of social bots through time series analysis and Structural Topic Model. The study finds that at the aggregate level there is a two-way agenda-setting between social bots and human accounts, and at the secondary level, social bots show different or even opposite agenda-setting effects in national/regional discussion. In addition, we find that social bots exhibit multiple positions in the conversation, reflecting the complexity of the manipulators behind them. This multiplicity of positions reveals that the role played by social bots is still based on the opposition of one side to the other, and the end result may exacerbate the conflict of online public opinion.
Based on a national survey of 1111 Chinese citizens, this study analyzes how exposure to fake news and perceptions of information overload are associated with the third-person effect. The findings indicate that fake news exposure correlates with perceived information overload and third-person perceptions of fake news. Respondents with higher levels of perceived information overload also report stronger third-person perceptions. In addition, Chinese respondents who believe that fake news affects others more than themselves are less likely to support stricter controls of fake news.
In this study, we examined online conversations on Twitter about the Russia-Ukraine War and investigated differences between bots and non-bots accounts. Using ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine’ as keywords, we employed a Twitter API to collect data from 17 February to 18 March on Twitter. We obtained a large dataset of over 3.7 million tweets generated by about one million distinct accounts. We then analyzed one percent of the data using interval sampling for bot detection and found that about 13.4 percent of the accounts were social media bots, responsible for about 16.7 percent of the tweets. We examined the difference between bots and non-bots regarding online conversations on the Russia-Ukraine War through account analysis, textual analysis, and interaction analysis. The results show that bots exist on both sides, bots from the Ukrainian side contributed a louder voice while bots on the Russian side demonstrated more effective communication. In addition, there were differences and similarities between bots and non-bots in the behavior of online conversations, but the difference seemed to be relatively weaker than those found in previous studies.
Social media chat groups, such as WeChat and WhatsApp groups, are widely applied in online communication. This research has conducted two studies to examine the individual level and collective level’s opinion dynamics in those groups. The opinion dynamic is driven by two variables, people’s perceived peer support and willingness of opinion expression. The perceived peer support influences the willingness of opinion expression, and the willingness influences the dynamics of real opinion‐expression. First, the quasi‐experimental study recruited twenty‐five participants as the observation group and found that decreasing perceived peer support would significantly increase individuals’ expression willingness to protect his/her opinion. To generalize the individual level findings to a collective level, the second study treated the social media chat groups as an undirected fully‐connected social network and simulated people’s opinion expression dynamics with an agent‐based model. The simulation indicated that (1) with the help of increased willingness of opinion expression, the minority opinion supporters as a collective did not fall silent but continue to express themselves and (2) increasing willingness of opinion expression would maintain the existence of minority opinion but could not help the minority reverse to the majority.
TV audiences today are more likely to use an additional media device to further engage with the television content, a phenomenon known as “second screening”. This study takes second screening research into an authoritarian context to investigate what motivates users to search for information, engage in discussions, and post on social media. We apply an O-S-O-R model and demonstrates an integrated procedure of second screening’s political effects among citizens of Beijing. Our findings showed that most of the direct and indirect paths in this model were significantly positive. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are also discussed.