Standard models of tax evasion use a static decision-under-uncertainty setting to determine how an individual’s evasion decision is affected by the fiscal instruments. Most of these models fail to create a framework, within which unique relationships between tax evasion and its main determinants (especially tax rates and actual income) could be derived. The purpose of this paper is to establish a new pattern of unambiguous relationships in the evasion theory, by shifting the emphasis from the comparative static analysis of previous studies to a comparative-dynamics framework in the context of a neoclassical growth model, in which time and the average burden from all kinds of taxes also play an important role in affecting the taxpayer’s decision making process.

This paper attempts to extend the theoretical and empirical methodology employed in previous literature, by proposing a utility maximization process to estimate the optimal tax revenue from a sample of 30 countries. It is shown that an optimal tax system is defined solely by two crucial determining factors: The productive capacity of the country (GDP) and consumers’ preferences (consumption spending). All the other variables can be disregarded, as macroeconomic determinants (GDP, consumption) tend to capture the impact of all the remaining factors on tax revenue. It is also shown that our utility maximization method generates tax-effort indices which do not differ significantly from those of IMF and World Bank studies. The actual tax burden for most of the sample countries is shown to be below its optimal level. As expected, the tax-effort performance of each of the sample countries appears to be affected by the variety of approaches employed throughout the text.

The focus of this paper is twofold. First, it examines the impact on work effort of changes in government purchases financed with lump‐sum taxes, in a neoclassical framework, with respect to four industrialised countries. Second, it reconsiders the expenditure–work effort relationship in a broader conceptual context that allows for distortionary taxation and a disaggregation of the income and substitution effects. Our findings are shown to cast doubt on the empirical plausibility of the prevailing (neoclassical and New Keynesian) models which seem to rely heavily on the lump‐sum tax notion, thus ignoring the substitution effects of distortionary taxation.

The present paper attempts to demonstrate that finding an appropriate trade-off between direct and indirect taxes can help smooth policy makers’ way through reconciling the contradictory notions of equity and efficiency. Our theoretical and empirical analysis is based on the assumption that direct taxes discourage work effort, thus impinging on the incentives to supply labour, to save and to invest, and finally, to grow, whereas indirect taxes discourage consumption and bear more heavily on the poor. Central to our discussion is the argument that carefully designed adjustments in the tax mix can reduce distortions in the consumption-leisure decision, thus leading to an optimal allocation of resources between the equity and efficiency objectives. To derive a competitive equilibrium setting, a social welfare function is maximized and the first-order conditions are manipulated to trace out the optimal direct-indirect tax rates that pave the way for the equity-efficiency goals to be reconciled with each other.

In this paper, we analyse the dynamic relationship between hours worked per employee (per self-employed) and marginal income tax-rate shocks in terms of both a comparative-dynamics model and a stochastic general equilibrium econometric model. The econometric model is estimated for Germany, UK and USA over the post-1960 period using the GMM estimation technique. Estimates in both models show that increases in the marginal income-tax rate exert negative effects on hours worked by both employees and the self-employed, but the response of the employees who are subject to tax withholding is stronger than the response of the self-employed.