Catherine Grainger

Dr. Catherine Grainger


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 May 2020 in Metacognition and Learning
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KCKym Craig
Kym Craig
DHDaniel Hale
Daniel Hale
CGCatherine Grainger
Catherine Grainger
MSMary E. Stewart
Mary E. Stewart
Metacognitive skills have been shown to be strongly associated with academic achievement and serve as the basis of many therapeutic treatments for mental health conditions. Thus, it is likely that training metacognitive skills can lead to improved academic skills and health and well-being. Because metacognition is an awareness of one’s own thoughts, and as such is not directly observable, it is often measured by self-report. This study reviews and critiques the use of self-report in evaluating metacognition by conducting systematic reviews and a meta-analysis of studies assessing metacognitive skills. Keyword searches were performed in EbscoHost, ERIC, PsycINFO, PsycArticles, Scopus, Web of Science, and WorldWideScience.org to locate all articles evaluating metacognition through self-report. 24,396 articles from 1982 through 2018 were screened for inclusion in the study. Firstly, a systematic review of twenty-two articles was conducted to review the ability of self-report measures to evaluate a proposed taxonomy of metacognition. Secondly, a systematic review and meta-analyses of 37 studies summarizes the ability of self-report to relate to metacognitive behavior and the possible effects of differences in research methods. Results suggest that self-reports provide a useful overview of two factors – metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. However, metacognitive processes as measured by self-report subscales are unclear. Conversely, the two factors of metacognition do not adequately relate to metacognitive behavior, but subscales strongly correlate across self-reports and metacognitive tasks. Future research should carefully consider the role of self-reports when designing research evaluating metacognition.

1 August 2014 in Journal of Abnormal Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CGCatherine Grainger
Catherine Grainger
DWDavid M. Williams
David M. Williams
SLSophie E. Lind
Sophie E. Lind
Metacognition refers to cognition about cognition and encompasses both knowledge of cognitive processes and the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitions. The current study aimed to establish whether metacognition is impaired in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). According to some theories, the ability to represent one's own mental states (an aspect of metacognition) relies on the same mechanism as the ability to represent others' mental states ("mindreading"). Given numerous studies have shown mindreading is impaired in ASD, there is good reason to predict concurrent impairments in metacognition. Metacognition is most commonly explored in the context of memory, often by assessing people's ability to monitor their memory processes. The current study addressed the question of whether people with ASD have difficulty monitoring the contents of their memory (alongside impaired mindreading). Eighteen intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD and 18 IQ- and age-matched neurotypical adults participated. Metamemory monitoring ability and mindreading ability were assessed by using a feeling-of-knowing task and the "animations" task, respectively. Participants also completed a self-report measure of metacognitive ability. In addition to showing impaired mindreading, participants with ASD made significantly less accurate feeling-of-knowing judgments than neurotypical adults, suggesting that metamemory monitoring (an aspect of metacognition) was impaired. Conversely, participants with ASD self-reported superior metacognitive abilities compared with those reported by neurotypical participants. This study provides evidence that individuals with ASD have metamemory monitoring impairments. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for our current understanding of metacognition in ASD and typical development are discussed.

1 May 2016 in Consciousness and Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CGCatherine Grainger
Catherine Grainger
DWDavid M. Williams
David M. Williams
SLSophie E. Lind
Sophie E. Lind
Metacognition consists of monitoring processes (the ability to accurately represent one's own mental states) and control processes (the ability to control one's cognitive processes effectively). Both processes play vital roles in self-regulated learning. However, currently it is unclear whether these processes are impaired in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). This study aimed to assess metacognition in thirty-two children with ASD, and 30 IQ-/age-matched neurotypical children, using a judgment of confidence task. It was found that children with ASD showed diminished accuracy in their judgments of confidence, indicating metacognitive monitoring impairments in ASD. Children with ASD also used monitoring to influence control processes significantly less than neurotypical children, despite little evidence of impairments in overall control ability.

6 November 2013 in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CGCatherine Grainger
Catherine Grainger
DWDavid M. Williams
David M. Williams
SLSophie E. Lind
Sophie E. Lind

1 January 2014 in Neuropsychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DWDavid M. Williams
David M. Williams
CJChristopher Jarrold
Christopher Jarrold
CGCatherine Grainger
Catherine Grainger
SLSophie E. Lind
Sophie E. Lind
Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember to carry out an intended action. Working memory is the ability to store information in mind while processing potentially distracting information. The few previous studies of PM in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have yielded inconsistent findings. Studies of working memory ability in ASD have suggested a selective impairment of "visual working memory." However, it remains unclear whether any such impairment is the result of diminished (domain-specific; visual/verbal) storage capacity or diminished (domain-general) processing capacity. We aim to clarify these issues and explore the relation between PM and working memory in ASD. Seventeen adults with ASD and 17 age- and IQ-matched comparison participants completed experimental measures of both event-based (perform action x when event y occurs) and time-based (perform action a at time b) PM, plus a self-report measure of PM skills. Participants also completed a working memory test battery. Participants with ASD self-reported diminished PM skill, and showed diminished performance on the time-based, but not event-based, PM task. On the working memory test battery, visual but not verbal storage capacity was diminished among participants with ASD, as was processing ability. Whereas visual storage was associated with event-based PM task performance among comparison participants, verbal storage was associated among ASD participants. ASD appears to involve a selective deficit in time-based PM and a selective difficulty with aspects of working memory that depend on the storage of visual information. However, event-based PM may be achieved through compensatory strategies in ASD.

21 November 2017 in Autism Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DWDavid M. Williams
David M. Williams
TNToby Nicholson
Toby Nicholson
CGCatherine Grainger
Catherine Grainger
Memory for (and perception of) information about the self is superior to memory for (and perception of) other kinds of information. This self‐reference effect (SRE) in memory appears diminished in ASD and related to the number of ASD traits manifested by neurotypical individuals (fewer traits = larger SRE). Here, we report the first experiments exploring the relation between ASD and the SRE in perception. Using a “Shapes” Task (Sui et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38, 1105, 2012), participants learned to associate three different shapes (triangle, circle, square) with three different labels representing self, a familiar other, or an unfamiliar other (e.g., “you”, “mother”, “stranger”). Participants then completed trials during which they were presented with one shape and one label for 100 ms, and made judgments about whether the shape and label was a match. In Experiment 1, neurotypical participants (n = 124) showed the expected SRE, detecting self‐related matches more reliably and quickly than matches involving familiar or unfamiliar other. Most important, number of ASD traits was unrelated to the size of the SRE for either accuracy or RT. Bayesian association analyses strongly supported the null hypothesis. In Experiment 2, there were no differences between 22 adults with ASD and 21 matched comparison adults in performance on the Shapes Task. Despite showing large and significant theory of mind impairments, participants with ASD showed the typical SRE and there were no associations with ASD traits in either group. In every case, Bayesian analyses favored the null hypothesis. These findings challenge theories about self‐representation in ASD, as discussed in the article. Autism Res 2018, 11: 331–341. © 2017 The Authors Autism Research published by International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.Lay Summary: Neurotypical people tend to find it easier to perceive and remember information that relates to themselves than information that relates to others. Research suggests that people with ASD show a diminished (or absent) self‐bias in memory and that severity of ASD predicts the extent of this diminution (more severe ASD = smaller self‐bias in memory). However, the current research suggests strongly that people with ASD do show a self‐bias in their perception. This research informs our understanding of psychological functioning in ASD and challenges theories regarding self‐awareness in this disorder.