Artículo de publicación ISIPublic school teachers are usually paid according to centralized earning schedules, in which their income depends mainly on experience. By contrast, in private schools, there is high wage dispersion, and salaries correspond mainly to teachers' performance. That dichotomous labour regulation encourages teachers with better unobservable skills to self-select into private schools because the likelihood of earning higher wages is higher than in public schools. The other side of the coin is the self-selection of 'bad' teachers into public schools. Using a representative sample of Chilean teachers, we estimate a two-sector Roy model to test self-selection. We find evidence of negative self-selection of teachers into public schools
9 September 2019 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
This paper aims to study the effect of family socioeconomic status (SES) on academic and labor market outcomes. The authors used a rich data set of administrative records for test scores, individual background and adult earnings of a cohort of agents, covering a period spanning the agents' upper-secondary education and their early years in the labor market. The authors find that students with the highest SES obtained a 1.5 standard deviations higher score in the college admission test than students who had the same academic outcomes in the eighth grade test but belong to the lowest SES. Similarly, among students that obtained the same scores in the college admission test, those with the highest SES earned monthly wages 0.7 standard deviations higher than those with the lowest SES. The findings highlight that family socioeconomic background continues to influence outcomes during individuals’ upper secondary education and early years in the labor market.
I develop an assignment model to quantify, in a unified framework, the causal effects of supply and demand forces on the evolution of the college wage premium in the US economy. Specifically, I quantify the relative contributions of four different forces: (i) a within-sector non-neutral technological change, (ii) the creation of new high-skill services/sectors, (iii) polarizing product demand shifts, and (iv) shifts in the relative supply of skilled labor. The model considers endogenous human capital accumulation. I find that positive supply shifts completely explain the fall of the skill premium during the period 1970–1980. Demand forces play a major role in the post-1980 period, when the skill premium rises. Among the demand forces, the results show an increasing contribution of polarizing product demand shifts over the decades. On the other hand, the effect of the within-sector non-neutral technological change is more important in the earlier decades of the post-1980 period.
I. Executive compensation has long occupied a central place in debates on corporate governance and managerial incentives. Scholars, boards, investors, and regulators continue to ask whether CEO pay...