A decision model for selecting a suitable supplier is a key to reducing the environmental impact in green supply chain management for high-tech companies. Traditional fuzzy weight average (FWA) adopts linguistic variable to determine weight by experts. However, the weights of FWA have not considered the public voice, meaning the viewpoints of consumers in green supply chain management. This paper focuses on developing a novel decision model for green supplier selection in the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) initiative through a fuzzy weighted average approach with social media. The proposed decision model uses the membership grade of the criteria and sub-criteria and its relative weights, which consider the volume of social media, to establish an analysis matrix of green supplier selection. Then, the proposed fuzzy weighted average approach is considered as an aggregating tool to calculate a synthetic score for each green supplier in the Belt and Road initiative. The final score of the green supplier is ordered by a non-fuzzy performance value ranking method to help the consumer make a decision. A case of green supplier selection in the light-emitting diode (LED) industry is used to demonstrate the proposed decision model. The findings demonstrate (1) the consumer’s main concerns are the “Quality” and “Green products” in LED industry, hence, the ranking of suitable supplier in FWA with social media information model obtained the difference result with tradition FWA; (2) OBOR in the LED industry is not fervently discussed in searches of Google and Twitter; and (3) the FWA with social media information could objectively analyze the green supplier selection because the novel model considers the viewpoints of the consumer.
This paper investigates cooperative advertising decisions in production–retailing chan-nels for seasonal products under demand seasonality. We develop analytical game-theoretic models to examine how advertising cooperation influences channel coor-dination and profit distribution between manufacturers and retailers. Two channel struc-tures are considered: a single-manufacturer–single-retailer channel and a sin-gle-manufacturer channel with two competing retailers. For each structure, Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium settings are analyzed and compared. Our results show that coop-erative advertising can serve as an effective coordination mechanism by increasing adver-tising intensity and improving channel efficiency. Retailers always benefit from manu-facturer-supported advertising through cost sharing and higher profitability, whereas the manufacturer’s incentive to participate depends on whether demand expansion out-weighs shared advertising costs. Importantly, we demonstrate that channel leadership plays a critical role: the Stackelberg equilibrium consistently dominates the Nash equilib-rium in terms of total channel profit. This study contributes to the cooperative advertising literature by explicitly incorporating demand seasonality and competing retailers, and by clarifying when cooperative advertising leads to Pareto improvements in seasonal supply chains.
In recent years, the touch panel industry has experienced rapid growth. With technological maturation and progressive cost reduction, touch technology has been widely adopted in human–machine interfaces. Currently, touch panels are predominantly employed in smartphones and tablet devices, and the industry is increasingly pursuing thinner, lighter designs, driving the development of diverse touch technologies, including one-glass solution (OGS), on-cell, and in-cell architectures. To enhance competitive advantage within the touch panel industry, it is essential to improve production efficiency and elevate product quality; consequently, yield has become a critical metric for evaluating industrial competitiveness. This study adopts the electrical test yield of Touch-on-Lens (TOL) touch-sensing glass as the primary performance indicator. A Six Sigma DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control) framework is applied to systematically address impedance-related quality defects occurring during manufacturing. First, key quality characteristics (KQCs) of the TOL touch-sensing glass process are rigorously defined. Subsequently, measurement system analysis (MSA) and process capability assessment are conducted. Next, the Taguchi method is employed to identify the most influential process factors affecting electrical test yield. Finally, response surface methodology (RSM) is utilized to determine the optimal combination of process parameter settings that maximize electrical test yield. Results from the empirical case study demonstrate that the electrical test yield improved significantly—from 90.2% to 93.6%. This outcome validates that the integrated application of the Six Sigma DMAIC methodology, combined with the Taguchi method and RSM, effectively enhances the electrical test yield of TOL sensing glass. The proposed approach offers a robust, data-driven improvement framework applicable to touch panel manufacturers seeking to optimize sensing-glass fabrication processes—thereby supporting broader industry efforts to improve product quality and reduce manufacturing costs.
This paper investigates cooperative advertising decisions in production–retailing channels for seasonal products under demand seasonality. We develop analytical game-theoretic models to examine how advertising cooperation influences channel coordination and profit distribution between manufacturers and retailers. Two channel structures are considered: a single-manufacturer–single-retailer channel and a single-manufacturer channel with two competing retailers. For each structure, Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium settings are analyzed and compared. Our results show that cooperative advertising can serve as an effective coordination mechanism by increasing advertising intensity and improving channel efficiency. Retailers always benefit from manufacturer-supported advertising through cost sharing and higher profitability, whereas the manufacturer’s incentive to participate depends on whether demand expansion outweighs shared advertising costs. Importantly, we demonstrate that channel leadership plays a critical role: the Stackelberg equilibrium consistently dominates the Nash equilibrium in terms of total channel profit. This study contributes to the cooperative advertising literature by explicitly incorporating demand seasonality and competing retailers, and by clarifying when cooperative advertising leads to Pareto improvements in seasonal supply chains.
This study develops a game-theoretic framework to analyze collaborative advertising decisions between manufacturers and retailers in seasonal product supply chains characterized by competitive–cooperative channel relationships. We formulate a mathematical programming model to jointly optimize advertising efforts, the manufacturer’s advertising cost-sharing rate, order quantities, and inventory decisions across distinct channel configurations—including a single manufacturer–retailer dyad and a competitive multi-channel market. Numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses are conducted to investigate how key structural parameters—particularly demand elasticity and channel power asymmetry—influence overall system performance and equilibrium decision outcomes. Results indicate that well-designed collaborative advertising mechanisms enhance total channel profitability and, under specific conditions, yield Pareto-improving outcomes for both parties. This study makes three primary contributions: (i) it integrates inter-firm competition with intra-channel cooperation within a unified strategic framework; (ii) it jointly coordinates advertising and inventory decisions—two critical operational levers—rather than treating them in isolation; and (iii) it embeds financial arrangements (e.g., cost sharing) endogenously into the analytical model, thereby offering a novel, theoretically grounded, and practically implementable decision-support framework for distribution systems operating in complex, dynamic market environments.