Cooperation is subject to cheating strategies that exploit the benefits of cooperation without paying the fair costs, and it has been a major goal of evolutionary biology to explain the origin and maintenance of cooperation against such cheaters. Here, we report that cheater genotypes indeed coexist in field colonies of a social insect, the parthenogenetic antPristomyrmex punctatus. The life history of this species is exceptional, in that there is no reproductive division of labour: all females fulfil both reproduction and cooperative tasks. Previous studies reported sporadic occurrence of larger individuals when compared with their nest-mates. These larger ants lay more eggs and hardly take part in cooperative tasks, resulting in lower fitness of the whole colony. Population genetic analysis showed that at least some of these large-bodied individuals form a genetically distinct lineage, isolated from cooperators by parthenogenesis. A phylogenetic study confirmed that this cheater lineage originated intraspecifically. Coexistence of cheaters and cooperators in this species provides a good model system to investigate the evolution of cooperation in nature.
Tracking animal movements such as walking is an essential task for understanding how and why animals move in an environment and respond to external stimuli. Different methods that implemented image analysis and a data logger such as GPS have been used in laboratory experiments and in field studies, respectively. Recently, animal movement patterns without stimuli have attracted an increasing attention in search for common innate characteristics underlying all of their movements. However, it is difficult to track the movements in a vast and homogeneous environment without stimuli because of space constraints in laboratories or environmental heterogeneity in the field, hindering our understanding of inherent movement patterns. Here, we applied an omnidirectional treadmill mechanism, or a servosphere, as a tool for tracking two-dimensional movements of small animals that can provide both a homogenous environment and a virtual infinite space for walking. To validate the use of our tracking system for assessment of the free-walking behavior, we compared walking patterns of individual pillbugs (Armadillidium vulgare) on the servosphere with that in two types of experimental flat arenas. Our results revealed that the walking patterns on the servosphere showed similar diffusive characteristics to those observed in the large arena simulating an open space, and we demonstrated that our mechanism provides more robust measurements of diffusive properties compared to a small arena with enclosure. Moreover, we showed that anomalous diffusion properties, including Lévy walk, can be detected from the free-walking behavior on our tracking system. Thus, our novel tracking system is useful to measure inherent movement patterns, which will contribute to the studies of movement ecology, ethology, and behavioral sciences.
17 September 2013 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Cooperation in biological, social, and economic groups is underpinned by public goods that are generated by group members at some personal cost. Theory predicts that public goods will be exploited by cheaters who benefit from the goods by not paying for them, thereby leading to the collapse of cooperation. This situation, described as the “public goods dilemma” in game theory, makes the ubiquity of cooperation a major evolutionary puzzle. Despite this generalization, the demonstration of genetic background and fitness effects of the public goods dilemma has been limited to interactions between viruses and between cells, and thus its relevance at higher levels of organismal complexity is still largely unexplored. Here we provide experimental evidence for the public goods dilemma in a social insect, the ant Pristomyrmex punctatus. In this species, all workers are involved in both asexual reproduction and cooperative tasks. Genetic cheaters infiltrate field colonies, reproducing more than the workers but shunning cooperative tasks. In laboratory experiments, cheaters outcompeted coexisting workers in both survival and reproduction, although a group composed only of cheaters failed to produce offspring. The operations of the public goods dilemma in P. punctatus showed a remarkable convergence with those in microbial societies, not only in fitness consequences but also in behavioral mechanisms. Our study reinforces the evolutionary impact of cheaters on diverse cooperative systems in the laboratory and in the field.