Hydropower activities must increasingly be evaluated from a sustainable development perspective. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the principle frequently applied to evaluate corporate contributions in this regard, though there exists no conceptual and theoretical basis that is common to the various approaches. With the present work, we fill this gap and provide a generic model that formally integrates the corporate and societal perspectives of hydropower activities within a welfare-economic framework that encompasses both externalities and distributional concerns. Building on this background and focusing on the current situation in Switzerland, the water tower of Western Europe, we particularly address the issues of water rights, resource rents and governance. This is crucial when analyzing investment projects of hydropower companies with shared private and public ownership; i.e., if external stakeholders are also sensitive shareholders who grant, at the same time, the company the right to operate. Altogether, this contribution shall support better informed decision making on both corporate and policy levels, especially regarding new and retrofitting investments in hydropower when social concerns are at stake.
The European electricity landscape is facing an ambivalent situation between: (1) common market platforms; and (2) national and subnational jurisdictions, which impose their specific rules on energy sectors. This particularly affects hydropower, as the latter faces inequalities in the procedures needed for the attribution of water rights. Besides jurisdictional disparities, the European Union requires this attribution to follow competitive processes and the integration of sustainable development goals for energy projects, while other countries connected to the European grid such as Switzerland and Norway still know different procedures and requirements. Therefore, this article addresses concerns regarding the lack of harmonization of water regimes in Europe. Imposing a common jurisdiction to countries connected to the European grid would be politically very challenging. Our approach overcomes this challenge by proposing a process adaptable to specific local rules and allows a comparison of water rights attribution procedures. In this frame, we propose a nine-step process, based on three goals: (1) to enhance competitive access by ensuring the highest rent transfer related to water rights; (2) to prioritize projects closer to sustainability goals; and (3) to ensure the efficiency of the process itself.