Recent advancements in supply chain literature have focused on joint sustainability within the context of suppliermanufacturer relationships, particularly in scenarios in which suppliers may exhibit insufficient sustainability efforts. This study examines the intersection of joint sustainability and advanced digital technology adoption (such as Blockchain) from the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0) perspective. This investigation elucidates the potential effects of implementing such technologies. However, the effects of these technologies on overall channel member profits are not a straightforward outcome due to the currently insufficient digitization levels among the stakeholders. By employing a game theory-based numerical analysis approach, the efficacy of Blockchain technology in enhancing joint sustainability efforts is assessed. We found that implementing Blockchain technology can improve channel members' profits by enabling them to make better decisions regarding pricing, subsidies, and sustainability efforts in the joint sustainability context. We also found that while the implementation can provide more benefits to the market, individual consumer benefits can be harmed by the supplier's opportunistic implementation behavior. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding joint sustainability development and the integration of Blockchain technology in the evolving landscape of digital supply chain innovation.
We investigate a multi-brands sustainable channel coordination problem where a national brand manufacturer sells a product through two local retailers competing against their own store brand product, respectively. We shows how the retailers strategically optimize the price and quality of private brands given the customer tastes and the production costs of the store brands in order to make their store brands sustainable. We identify two underlying strategic forces; a competitive force, and a quality force. First, we find that retailers have an incentive to position their store brand far away from the national brand in order to maximize monopolistic power. This strategic force attenuate the incentives for customer to switch to other retailer’s store brands. One the other hand, we show that the retailers prefer increasing the store brand’s quality to get more profit margin when the production cost is relatively high as well.
31 March 2023 in Journal of Transportation Security
We investigate how a firm strategically manages the characteristics of a menu of three-part tariff to maximize its profit while consumers self-select the products. As the unit price designed for low-type segments and fixed fee as a function of free allowance increases, the firm can make a higher profit by offering more quantity units to its low segment customers. These two dynamic forces also shape the information rent, which is generated due to an information asymmetry, and hence reduced. Thus, this condition will eventually mitigate the issue of cannibalization.
28 October 2021 in INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research
We investigate how supplier performance is influenced by the behaviors (self-interested behaviors and gatekeeping actions) of a supplier’s salesperson and engineer, and how such behaviors affect a performance-based contract design to ensure the desired performance from the supplier. This article develops a incentive contract that proves how such behaviors affect supplier performance, elucidating how agents’ behaviors influence a buyer’s incentive contract form for collaboration with the supplier. Our study found that in general, the behaviors of salespeople and engineers can damage supplier performance. Their impact changes depending on some contingent factors, proposing incentive contract forms that can mitigate the negative consequences of the behaviors on supplier and buyer performance. This paper takes multiple agents’ behaviors and their behavioral disutility into consideration when developing an incentive contract.