YUEHUA XU

Dr. YUEHUA XU

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2014 in Organization Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DYDaphne W. Yiu
Daphne W. Yiu
YXYUEHUA XU
YUEHUA XU
WWWilliam P. Wan
William P. Wan
This study extends the research on corporate financial fraud by developing a new perspective on the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments premised on social learning theory. We posit that firms vicariously learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues, environmental cues, and social cues in the inhibitive learning process, thus being deterred from committing future fraudulence. Using a matched sample of 604 observations of Chinese listed firms between 2002 and 2008, our findings show that an observing firm is deterred from committing fraud if the peers in its industry are caught and punished. We further find that such deterrence effects are subject to how the observing firm evaluates the possibility of being caught and the likelihood it will be punished the same way if it violates similar prohibitions. In particular, inhibitive learning effects are positively moderated by punishments of prominent firms and model–observer similarity but negatively attenuated by the development of the legal system. Our study sheds light on the corporate fraud literature by illuminating the indirect, inhibitive learning process from vicarious punishments and identifying the conditions for differential learning/deterrence outcomes of the observing firms.

1 December 2018 in Long Range Planning
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Journal Article
Closed access
YXYUEHUA XU
YUEHUA XU
LZLin Zhang
Lin Zhang
HCHonghui Chen
Honghui Chen

12 March 2018 in Journal of Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
DYDaphne W. Yiu
Daphne W. Yiu
WWWilliam P. Wan
William P. Wan
YXYUEHUA XU
YUEHUA XU
How corporate governance mechanisms function in transition economies is a key topic for corporate governance researchers and policy makers. We propose that alternative governance mechanisms are in place to mitigate corporate fraudulent behaviors in the fluid state of transition economies where the establishment and enforcement of corporate governance legislation are presently insufficient. Drawing on the twin set of institutional logics—the institutional embeddedness logic and the institutional substitution logic—we posit that three salient types of prevailing alternative governance mechanisms (relational, administrative, and foreign governance) play important roles in transition economies because they are complementary to the institutional conditions at the time of the transition process. Conducting a bivariate probit analysis of a matched sample of corporate financial fraud cases in China, we find that strategic alliances, business group affiliation, nontradable state shares, local government ownership, use of foreign auditors, and foreign listing can deter corporate financial fraud, while foreign listing is also effective in detecting fraud. We also find that the deterrence effects of strategic alliances and business group affiliation become weaker as law development improves, while foreign listing and legal governance are completely substitutive. Our study provides a contextualized view of corporate governance that connects its effectiveness with institutionalization and the institutional state of a country. Our study also enriches our understanding of some unfamiliar forms of governance mechanisms that are in place and complementary to a country’s institutional conditions.

18 June 2021 in Journal of Business Ethics
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
LZLin Zhang
Lin Zhang
YXYUEHUA XU
YUEHUA XU
HCHonghui Chen
Honghui Chen

17 February 2020 in Asia Pacific Journal of Management
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Journal Article
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YXYUEHUA XU
YUEHUA XU
GZGuangtao Zeng
Guangtao Zeng

27 December 2019 in Management and Organization Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
LZLin Zhang
Lin Zhang
YXYUEHUA XU
YUEHUA XU
HCHonghui Chen
Honghui Chen
RJRuntian Jing
Runtian Jing
This study examines corporate philanthropy in the context of corporate wrongdoing punishment in emerging markets. Building on institutional theory, we propose that in emerging markets, after being punished for fraudulent behavior by the government, which is collectively the largest institution, convicted firms tend to use corporate philanthropy as an institutional strategy to regain legitimacy. Using data of Chinese-listed firms that were punished for financial fraud in the ten years from 2004 to 2013, our findings show the subsequent growth of corporate philanthropy to be positively related to punishment severity. Furthermore, convicted firms’ media visibility, dominant state ownership, and national political appointment strengthen the effect of punishment severity on corporate philanthropy increase. Our institutional perspective offers new insights into why firms engage in corporate philanthropy after fraud punishment.