Identifying adversarial examples is beneficial for understanding deep networks and developing robust models. However, existing attacking methods for image object detection have two limitations: weak transferability---the generated adversarial examples often have a low success rate to attack other kinds of detection methods, and high computation cost---they need much time to deal with video data, where many frames need polluting. To address these issues, we present a generative method to obtain adversarial images and videos, thereby significantly reducing the processing time. To enhance transferability, we manipulate the feature maps extracted by a feature network, which usually constitutes the basis of object detectors. Our method is based on the Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) framework, where we combine a high-level class loss and a low-level feature loss to jointly train the adversarial example generator. Experimental results on PASCAL VOC and ImageNet VID datasets show that our method efficiently generates image and video adversarial examples, and more importantly, these adversarial examples have better transferability, therefore being able to simultaneously attack two kinds of representative object detection models: proposal based models like Faster-RCNN and regression based models like SSD.

In the realm of large vision language models (LVLMs), jailbreak attacks serve as a red-teaming approach to bypass guardrails and uncover safety implications. Existing jailbreaks predominantly focus on the visual modality, perturbing solely visual inputs in the prompt for attacks. However, they fall short when confronted with aligned models that fuse visual and textual features simultaneously for generation. To address this limitation, this paper introduces the Bi-Modal Adversarial Prompt Attack (BAP), which executes jailbreaks by optimizing textual and visual prompts cohesively. Initially, we adversarially embed universally adversarial perturbations in an image, guided by a few-shot query-agnostic corpus (e.g., affirmative prefixes and negative inhibitions). This process ensures that the adversarial image prompt LVLMs to respond positively to harmful queries. Subsequently, leveraging the image, we optimize textual prompts with specific harmful intent. In particular, we utilize a large language model to analyze jailbreak failures and employ chain-of-thought reasoning to refine textual prompts through a feedback-iteration manner. To validate the efficacy of our approach, we conducted extensive evaluations on various datasets and LVLMs, demonstrating that our BAP significantly outperforms other methods by large margins (+29.03% in attack success rate on average). Additionally, we showcase the potential of our attacks on black-box commercial LVLMs, such as GPT-4o and Gemini.