This article considers the origins of the subprime turmoil and the way the financial system has responded to it. It explains that there are both old and new components in both the origins and the propagation of the subprime shock. Old components include government financial subsidies for bearing risk, accommodative monetary policy, and adverse selection facilitated by asymmetric information. New components include the central role of agency problems in asset management, the ability of financial institutions to raise new capital from external sources, the activist role of the United States Treasury Department and Federal Reserve, and improvements in U.S. financial system diversification resulting from deregulation, consolidation, and globalization. In light of these old and new elements of the origins and propagation of the subprime turmoil, the article concludes by considering the near-term future of financial and macroeconomic performance, and the implications for monetary policy, regulatory policy, and ...
16 May 2009 in Journal of Financial Services Research
We investigate determinants of slave family discounts in the New Orleans slave market. We find large price discounts for families unrelated to scale effects, childcare costs, legal restrictions, or transport costs. We posit that because family members voluntarily cared for each other, sellers sometimes found it advantageous to keep families together (when families included needy or dependent members). Evidence from ship manifests carrying slaves for sale in New Orleans provides direct evidence for selectivity bias in explaining slave family discounts. Children likely to have been shipped with their mothers are 1 to 2 inches shorter than other children.
30 April 2009 in The Journal of Structured Finance
The government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was necessary because of their massive losses on more than $1.6 trillion of subprime and Alt-A investments, almost all of which were added to their single-family book of business between 2005 and 2007. The most plausible explanation for the sudden adoption of this disastrous course-disastrous for them and for the U.S. financial markets—is their desire to retain the support of Congress after their accounting scandals in 2003 and 2004 and the challenges to their business model that ensued. Although the strategy worked-Congress did not adopt strong government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) reform legislation until the Republicans demanded it as the price for Senate passage of a housing bill in July 2008—it led inevitably to the government takeover and the enormous junk loan losses still to come. Now that the federal government has been required to take effective control of Fannie and Freddie and to decide their fate, it is important to understand the reasons ...
The role of underwriters is altered in new seasoned equity offering deal types in which the offering follows quickly after its announcement. Controlling for the endogenous matching between issuing firms and underwriters, we find increased underwriter reputation mitigates the immediate price impact of announcing an accelerated bookbuilt offering, exacerbates the price impact of announcing a bought offering, and has no immediate price impact for fully marketed deals. In contrast, underwriter reputation positively affects price outcomes for fully marketed deals around the offer date. Reputation effects are not apparent in the absence of controlling for the endogenous matching.