Mingyun Gao

Dr. Mingyun Gao


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 June 2026 in Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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MGMingyun Gao
Mingyun Gao
QXQinzi Xiao
Qinzi Xiao
RWRuiping Wu
Ruiping Wu
LXLixin Xia
Lixin Xia
Growing awareness of low-carbon environmental protection necessitates incorporating the dynamic evolution of consumer preferences into supply chain management. Unlike prior research focusing on single financing or static preferences, this paper uniquely integrates financing choice under mixed-financing conditions and government incentives under dynamic information updating. We investigate a low-carbon supply chain where a capital-constrained retailer combines low-carbon credit financing (LCF) and trade credit financing (TCF) and under the updating of consumption preferences during the lead time, and build a carbon reduction optimization model. The manufacturer’s abatement and production, the retailer’s financing balancing LCF and TCF under bankruptcy risk, and ordering are modeled within a two-period newsvendor framework with demand information updating. Result analysis reveals the following: (i) Under preference updating and equal subsidy amounts, LCF consistently induces higher carbon reduction efficiency than promotion allowances. (ii) Counterintuitively, promotion allowances dynamically enhance the supply chain’s total profit more effectively than LCF, exposing a critical divergence between environmental efficiency and economic performance. (iii) Across all incentive schemes (single or combined), the marginal gain in carbon reduction efficiency declines with increasing subsidy intensity. These findings imply that policymakers should flexibly align the choice of incentive instrument with the prioritized objective—carbon reduction or supply chain profitability—given the diminishing marginal returns.

5 November 2026 in Administrative Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DWDan Wang
Dan Wang
MGMingyun Gao
Mingyun Gao
QRQiyu Ren
Qiyu Ren
PHPeng Hao
Peng Hao
This study examines how inherited local regulatory discretion shapes rule-based delegation and reward-based contracting in China’s Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) program. We develop a principal-agent model with endogenous allowance and offset markets, privately observed regional emissions, and divergent central–local policy preferences. Using equilibrium analysis and mechanism design, we analytically characterize governance arrangements in two institutional settings: Greenfield regions where no policy-specific local regime predates central intervention and Brownfield regions where a legacy regime preserves local discretion. The benchmark balances compliance-cost savings from offsets against reduced internal abatement. In Greenfield regions, the optimal upper-limit rule implements transfer-free interval delegation, preserving local discretion below a central cap and constraining it above the cap. In Brownfield regions, the legacy outside option introduces a type-dependent participation constraint, and policy adjustment requires rewards covering policy compensation and, where needed, information rent for truthful reporting. Information-rent costs shift policy toward local preferences relative to the symmetric-information contracting benchmark. Sufficiently effective rewards induce adjustment across all types; weaker rewards leave higher-emission types at their preferred policies without payment. The results identify the continuation value of local discretion as a source of implementation costs and explain how institutional history shifts policy coordination from rule-based restrictions toward reward-based contracting.