Caren M. Walker

Dr. Caren M. Walker

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2017 in Child Development
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Journal Article
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CWCaren M. Walker
Caren M. Walker
TLTania Lombrozo
Tania Lombrozo
JWJoseph J. Williams
Joseph J. Williams
ARAnna N. Rafferty
Anna N. Rafferty
AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik

1 October 2017 in Cognition
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Journal Article
Closed access
CWCaren M. Walker
Caren M. Walker
TLTania Lombrozo
Tania Lombrozo

18 August 2022 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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Journal Article
Open access
JAJamie Amemiya
Jamie Amemiya
EMElizabeth Mortenson
Elizabeth Mortenson
GHGail D. Heyman
Gail D. Heyman
CWCaren M. Walker
Caren M. Walker
To make accurate causal inferences about social-group inequalities, people must consider structural causes. Structural causes are a distinct type of extrinsic cause—they are stable, interconnected societal forces that systematically advantage some social groups and disadvantage others. We propose a new cognitive framework to specify how people attribute inequality to structural causes. This framework is rooted in counterfactual theories of causal judgment and suggests that people will recognize structural factors as causal when they are perceived as “difference-making” for inequality above and beyond any intrinsic causes. Building on this foundation, our framework makes the following contributions. First, we propose specific types of evidence that support difference-making inferences about structural factors: within-group change (i.e., observing that disadvantaged groups’ outcomes improve under better societal conditions) and well-matched between-group comparisons (i.e., observing that advantaged group members, who have similar baseline traits to the disadvantaged group, experience more favorable societal conditions and life outcomes). Second, we consider contextual, cognitive, and motivational barriers that may complicate the availability and acceptance of this evidence. We conclude by exploring how the framework might be applied in future research examining people’s causal inferences about inequality.

1 November 2016 in Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CWCaren M. Walker
Caren M. Walker
SBSophie Bridgers
Sophie Bridgers
AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik

7 October 2021 in WIREs Cognitive Science
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Journal Article
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ELElizabeth Lapidow
Elizabeth Lapidow
CWCaren M. Walker
Caren M. Walker

24 June 2019 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
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ACAlexandra Carstensen
Alexandra Carstensen
JZJing Zhang
Jing Zhang
GHGail D. Heyman
Gail D. Heyman
GFGenyue Fu
Genyue Fu
KLKang Lee
Kang Lee
CWCaren M. Walker
Caren M. Walker
Early abstract reasoning has typically been characterized by a “relational shift,” in which children initially focus on object features but increasingly come to interpret similarity in terms of structured relations. An alternative possibility is that this shift reflects a learned bias, rather than a typical waypoint along a universal developmental trajectory. If so, consistent differences in the focus on objects or relations in a child’s learning environment could create distinct patterns of relational reasoning, influencing the type of hypotheses that are privileged and applied. Specifically, children in the United States may be subject to culture-specific influences that bias their reasoning toward objects, to the detriment of relations. In experiment 1, we examine relational reasoning in a population with less object-centric experience—3-y-olds in China—and find no evidence of the failures observed in the United States at the same age. A second experiment with younger and older toddlers in China (18 to 30 mo and 30 to 36 mo) establishes distinct developmental trajectories of relational reasoning across the two cultures, showing a linear trajectory in China, in contrast to the U-shaped trajectory that has been previously reported in the United States. In a third experiment, Chinese 3-y-olds exhibit a bias toward relational solutions in an ambiguous context, while those in the United States prefer object-based solutions. Together, these findings establish population-level differences in relational bias that predict the developmental trajectory of relational reasoning, challenging the generality of an initial object focus and suggesting a critical role for experience.