Movement restrictions are a critical component of response plans for an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak in the United States. These restrictions are likely to include requiring permits to move animals and products within, into, and out of 5‐km control areas (CAs) established around confirmed positive farms. For quarantined finishing farms located within a CA, diagnostic testing is an expected criterion for receival of a permit to move pigs to a harvest facility or removal of quarantine. A stochastic disease transmission and active surveillance model were used to evaluate premovement active surveillance protocols varying by the number of samples and timing of sample collection before movement. Surveillance protocol scenarios were evaluated for several different sampling prioritization schemes; virus strains of medium or high virulence; barn sizes of 1,200, 2,400, and 4,800 pigs; and farms with average to high mortality and morbidity during routine production. Surveillance protocols that included prioritization schemes targeting dead pigs and pigs with clinical signs resulted in the highest probabilities of detection and the lowest numbers of infectious pigs at the time of movement in barns that went undetected. There was some evidence that targeting sick pigs prior to dead pigs may be more effective for moderately virulent strains. However, in most scenarios, including all highly virulent strain scenarios and moderately virulent strain scenarios in barn sizes of 1,200 with average farm performance, prioritization of dead versus sick pigs first did not have a large impact on the predicted outcomes. Increasing sample sizes improved outcomes, though only marginal gains were achieved once the available dead and sick were sampled. Predicted outcomes may be further improved by sampling the available dead and sick pigs in a barn across multiple days, though the associated increase in the probability of detection was minor.

Vaccination is commonly used to minimize disease impacts on birds and promote sustainable poultry production. Vaccination against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) differs because HPAI is classified as a foreign animal disease in the US and disease control falls under federal jurisdiction. Vaccination for HPAI could negatively affect the nation’s ability to export poultry and poultry products, representing the largest barrier to implementation. However, the continued burden of global HPAI cases requires a reevaluation of the cost of ongoing outbreaks and the need for new mitigation strategies, including HPAI vaccine use.

During highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks, the United States Department of Agriculture response requires infected egg production premises to discard on-site poultry products, including eggs that have been processed and stored prior to infection of the site. The disposal of these eggs contributes to global food insecurity through market disruptions, industry revenue loss, and federal indemnity paid. Further, rural farming communities are economically destabilized and farmer health and well-being challenged. To support continuity of business movement decisions during HPAI outbreaks, the Secure Poultry Supply team at the University of Minnesota along with an egg sector stakeholder workgroup has been examining the risk of moving to market processed, segregated, and stored eggs from an infected premises that were laid by uninfected flocks (i.e., a group of egg-laying hens kept in one house/barn during their entire lay cycle). Three important criteria for achieving both acceptable risk and confidence for movement were identified: identification and removal of potentially contaminated eggs from the cooler; protection of cooler eggs from recontamination; and science-assessed egg truck disinfection protocols for exiting an infected premises. The science behind biosecurity and biocontainment practices and risk determination for moving eggs off infected premises are discussed. Confidence in movements determined to be low risk may provide a means for farm and food–protein sustainability.

Proactive disease transmission pathway analyses break complex transmission routes into simpler steps, making risks and uncertainties easier to identify. This approach is especially valuable for African Swine Fever (ASF), a difficult-to-control disease in low-biosecurity settings or when biosecurity practices are inconsistently applied. To support targeted biosecurity planning, a pathway analysis was conducted that is specific to pork harvest facilities in the United States. The analysis focused on two federally inspected plants that slaughter market hogs and produce primal cuts. Inputs, outputs, and potential transmission pathways were identified through a literature review, site visits, and facility personnel interviews. Because ASF virus remains stable at low temperatures and in many pork products, particular attention was given to pathways involving storage conditions, waste materials, and processing steps such as heating or pH modification. Processing steps were evaluated against existing process control plans and ASF inactivation thresholds to determine mitigation status. Of 42 identified pathways, 39 were classified as unmitigated or of unknown mitigation status. These unmitigated or unknown pathways—broadly involving pigs, people, vehicles, and waste—represent the highest priorities for further risk assessment work and for exploring ways to develop or strengthen biosecurity protocols that reduce ASF transmission.

The U.S. Food Safety Modernization Act, administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), requires animal feed and pet food facilities to conduct a hazard analysis by identifying and evaluating potential hazards in animal food. This paper describes the creation of an information tool designed to help animal food facilities comply with this requirement. A thorough search of the scientific literature and FDA recall data identified the occurrence of hazards in animal food, assessed the severity of the hazards, and provided a scoring system useful for the identification and prioritization of specific animal food-hazard-species combinations.