Hua Cheng

Dr. Hua Cheng


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
19 July 2026
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
FYFengyuan Yu
Fengyuan Yu
YMYuncong Ma
Yuncong Ma
HSHongjing Song
Hongjing Song
CHChenlin Huang
Chenlin Huang
HCHua Cheng
Hua Cheng
BYBo Yu
Bo Yu

21 May 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MCMantun Chen
Mantun Chen
HCHua Cheng
Hua Cheng
TSTing Su
Ting Su
MCMinghui Chen
Minghui Chen
WCWenjun Cai
Wenjun Cai
HZHongcheng Zou
Hongcheng Zou
This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on the evaluation methodologies and capability boundaries of Large Language Models (LLMs) in cybersecurity. We propose a Three-Dimensional Taxonomy Matrix to systematize existing metrics across offensive domains, defensive applications, and inherent architectural flaws. Beyond categorization, this matrix functions as a predictive framework to expose structural evaluation blind spots. Specifically, by intersecting target domains with failure attributions, it identifies a critical, unresolved frontier: measuring cross-architecture semantic equivalence in low-level reverse engineering. Empirically, synthesizing 39 frontier benchmarks reveals a systemic evaluation gap: static metric success rarely translates into end-to-end adversarial efficacy. In offensive domains, high penetration rates correlate strongly with pre-training data contamination. When subjected to semantics-preserving code obfuscation as a stress test, zero-shot, tool-free exploit success rates collapse to near 0%. In defensive contexts, cross-procedural code auditing struggles, yielding a peak F1-score of only 23.83%. Furthermore, models suffer from over-alignment-induced functional degradation, with joint-testing frameworks recording up to a 77% functional loss in automated program repair. Our analysis strongly suggests that purely autoregressive mechanisms drive severe technical hallucinations, evidenced by a 19.7% package dependency fabrication rate. Evaluations also expose significant attack surfaces and a significant safety-utility tradeoff: models succumb to prompt leakage attacks at rates up to 86.2%, while heavily aligned versions simultaneously exhibit excessively high False Refusal Rates (FRR) for benign, borderline security queries. Finally, we delineate a theoretical neuro-symbolic roadmap—integrating LLM heuristics with deterministic formal methods—to structurally mitigate the limitations of the autoregressive paradigm.