Timothy Nordstrom

Dr. Timothy Nordstrom


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 December 2019 in Journal of Peace Research
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JPJon C W Pevehouse
Jon C W Pevehouse
TNTimothy Nordstrom
Timothy Nordstrom
RMRoseanne W McManus
Roseanne W McManus
AJAnne Spencer Jamison
Anne Spencer Jamison
This article summarizes the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) Version 3.0 datasets. The new datasets include information about the population of IGOs in the international system and state participation in those formal international institutions from 1816 to 2014. Consistent with Versions 2.0 and 2.3, Version 3.0 of the IGO data comes in three forms: country-year, IGO-year, and joint dyadic membership. This article briefly describes the data collection process and identifies important changes to the dataset before moving to analyze fundamental patterns in the data. Most notable among the changes from earlier versions of the data is the inclusion of annual membership data for the 1815–1964 time period. In addition, we present information about the overall trends in the institutionalization of cooperation at both the global and regional levels, with the latter focusing on the interesting membership dynamics in Asia and Africa. We then track and discuss patterns in state memberships and examine how these changes manifest in the dyadic data. The article concludes with a discussion of how the COW IGO 3.0 data compare to other prominent datasets on state participation in international institutions and highlights some new areas of research that will benefit from the release of the updated IGO membership dataset.

1 February 2005 in The Journal of Politics
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Journal Article
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DCDavid H. Clark
David H. Clark
TNTimothy Nordstrom
Timothy Nordstrom

29 September 2008 in American Journal of Political Science
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Journal Article
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DCDavid H. Clark
David H. Clark
TNTimothy Nordstrom
Timothy Nordstrom
WRWilliam Reed
William Reed

2 August 2013 in Games
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Journal Article
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KSKatri Sieberg
Katri Sieberg
DCDavid Clark
David Clark
CHCharles A. Holt
Charles A. Holt
TNTimothy Nordstrom
Timothy Nordstrom
WRWilliam Reed
William Reed
Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by conflict with a random outcome. Observed demands at each stage are significantly correlated with power, as measured by the probability of winning in the event of disagreement. Demand patterns, however, are flatter than theoretical predictions, and conflict occurs in a significant proportion of the interactions, regardless of the degree of the power asymmetry. To address these deviations from the standard game-theoretic predictions, we also estimated a logit quantal response model, which generated the qualitative patterns that are observed in the data. This one-parameter generalization of the Nash equilibrium permits a deconstruction of the strategic incentives that cause demands to be less responsive to power asymmetries than Nash predictions.

6 December 2023 in Conflict Management and Peace Science
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Journal Article
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BJBenjamin Jones
Benjamin Jones
EMEleonora Mattiacci
Eleonora Mattiacci
TNTimothy Nordstrom
Timothy Nordstrom
What is the effect of nuclear latency on states’ conflict behaviors? Defined as the ability to produce fissile material without the actual possession of nuclear weapons, nuclear latency is much more common in the international system than nuclear weapons are. Yet present studies might have underestimated its impact on conflict. We argue that, given its ambiguous nature as a dual-use technology, nuclear latency has the potential to significantly alter the effect of leader type on conflict. In particular, while conventional wisdom about hawks and doves suggests that the former should be more prone to conflict than the latter, nuclear latency blurs the distinction between leader's types. Bridging together studies of nuclear latency and leader type, we study how nuclear latency shapes the impact of leader type on the propensity of initiating conflict or being targeted. We find that in the absence of latency, hawkish leaders are more likely to initiate disputes than dovish leaders. However, latency muddies the waters. Thus, leader characteristics does not affect dispute initiation for latent states.

1 January 2004 in World Politics
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CBCharles Boehmer
Charles Boehmer
TNTimothy Nordstrom
Timothy Nordstrom
JCJ O Cathie
J O Cathie