During the critical period of agricultural green transformation, clarifying the evolutionary logic of farmers’ green production behavior under a multi-stakeholder framework provides significant insights for implementing “Dual Carbon” goals, establishing long-term mechanisms for high-quality agricultural development, and resolving deep-seated contradictions in agricultural non-point source pollution. Based on the social co-governance and public participation framework, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government departments, farmer groups, and the general public, grounded in cost–benefit analysis, social governance friction, and evolutionary game theory. Through simulation, the study explores the equilibrium states and the specific impacts of varying parameter values on stable points. The findings reveal that: (1) The “interest price scissors” (benefit disparity) between green and conventional production is the key determinant of farmers’ strategic equilibrium. Once this structural contradiction is resolved, green production becomes the optimal strategy. (2) Farmers are highly sensitive to marginal cost–benefit fluctuations, leading to a sequential behavioral cascade: farmers retreat first, followed by the government, and finally the public. (3) Public participation cost is the pivotal variable for activating the co-governance mechanism, and the application of digital governance tools determines the time required to reach equilibrium. (4) A “Success Paradox” exists in government regulation; incentive mechanisms must be adjusted promptly after initial success. (5) Integrated policy combinations outperform single instruments; breaking the “locked-in” state requires a policy shock of sufficient intensity. This research offers a theoretical basis and policy enlightenment for optimizing the social co-governance landscape and promoting sustainable agricultural modernization.

Multilevel public finance is a social-administrative system in which authority, fiscal resources, information, and implementation responsibilities circulate across government tiers. China’s Province-Managing-County (PMC) reform provides a case for evaluating how governance redesign affects county-recorded fiscal expenditure. We define the system boundary as the province–prefecture–county fiscal governance chain and decompose the reform into administrative power delegation (D1), which changes decision rights, and fiscal direct reporting (D2), which changes fiscal-flow paths. Using a county-level panel of 2219 counties in 31 provinces from 2000 to 2019, we combine generalized synthetic control, Matrix Completion, panel unconditional quantile regression, and spatial diagnostics. The average effect is positive in the preferred gsynth specification and the Matrix Completion benchmark, but the magnitude is model-dependent: 16.7% under gsynth and 8.1% under Matrix Completion, with further sensitivity to latent-factor choices. Reform-type estimates and a common-model CATE equality test suggest stronger estimated effects for D1 than D2, interpreted as institutional heterogeneity rather than causal dominance. Distributional and spatial diagnostics indicate weaker lower-tail effects and geographically uneven absorption. The findings suggest that changing decision rights and fiscal-flow paths can reshape county fiscal system outputs.

We use China Family Panel Studies data to construct a four-party model of local government, healthcare providers, a service-integration platform, and older households and examine why medical spending rises after hospitalization while changes in household debt are not statistically detectable in the next survey wave. The model combines a Stackelberg game, quantal response equilibrium, and Markov state transitions to analyze protection payments, cost formation, service coordination, and household financing. The empirical results show that medical consumption and household out-of-pocket payments increase during hospitalization waves, whereas the effects on debt entry and debt persistence are not statistically detectable, and the debt-persistence estimate is imprecise. Under literature-supported directions and normalized parameters, the scenarios associate stronger protection, lower provider coordination costs, and higher net returns to platform accountability with lower household financing. Financing costs first affect financing strategies and then affect two-year debt states. By incorporating debt transitions into a multi-party framework for medical financial protection, the analysis connects protection payments, household financing, and financial states to clarify the observed debt-transition pattern.

County economic growth in multi-tiered fiscal systems depends not only on the volume of transfers but also on whether those transfers pass through intermediary governments. This paper separates administrative delegation from fiscal chain redesign in province-managed county reforms in China. We study 1537 counties from 2000 to 2023 and compare D2, which creates direct province–county fiscal accounts, with D1, which delegates administrative authority but keeps the prefectural intermediary. The empirical design uses panel difference-in-differences estimators, synthetic difference-in-differences, double machine learning robustness checks, and exploratory heterogeneity diagnostics. Based on a placebo-corrected lower bound and a cross-estimator upper bound, D2 is associated with a conservative growth range of 0.35 to 1.0 percentage points per year, while the D1 estimate is imprecise. D2 is also associated with higher contemporaneous per capita fiscal expenditure, but the one-year lagged mediator check does not support a fully identified expenditure mechanism. Heterogeneity patterns are consistent with stronger effects in transfer-dependent counties, but they remain exploratory. The outcome is county economic growth, not a composite sustainability index. The results support a focused governance claim. More reliable transfer delivery is consistent with improved local growth capacity, while fiscal, social, and environmental sustainability remain outside the measured outcome space.

Blocked bank withdrawals generate concentrated funding requests and online discussion, while discussion activity and funding resolution can follow different timelines. This study develops a four-party evolutionary game of regulators, financial institutions, information disseminators, and claimants. Original posts, publicly visible comments, and public resolution documents from the Henan village bank event provide the practical setting for examining strategic evolution under funding and information conditions. Regulatory credibility promotes orderly waiting when payment capacity, executable advance-payment arrangements, and reliable information provide support. When proactive action benefits all parties and unresolved demands dissipate faster than financial and information pressure accumulates, the system returns to coordinated governance after small perturbations. This study integrates funding arrangements, information governance, and multi-actor strategic interaction into a unified framework to examine payment-risk governance following blocked withdrawals.