Nadia El Mrabet

Dr. Nadia El Mrabet

CEA-Tech, Departement SAS, Centre CMP, Mines de Saint-Etienne, 13541 Gardanne, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 October 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DBDavide Bellizia
Davide Bellizia
NMNadia El Mrabet
Nadia El Mrabet
Apostolos FournarisApostolos Fournaris
Apostolos Fournaris
SPSimon Pontie
Simon Pontie
Francesco RegazzoniFrancesco Regazzoni
Francesco Regazzoni
EVEmanuele Valea
Emanuele Valea
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) will become soon the standard for many systems of the future. With the advent of quantum computers, all encrypted communications based on traditional asymmetric cryptography (e.g., RSA, ECC) will become insecure. The definition the PQC standards is an on going process proceeding at a fast pace, involving new and largely unexplored cryptographic primitives. For this reason, the design of hardware implementations of PQC algorithms is still under study. In this paper, we introduce the fundamentals of PQC, with a focus on lattice-based cryptography and its hardware security issues, namely side-channel and fault-based attacks. Then, we focus on isogeny-based cryptography and the SIKE algorithm. We highlight the importance of fault-tolerant design choices through the presentation of a fault attack, based on the electromagnetic injection of transient faults, targeting this cryptographic primitive. Finally, we show an interesting idea that starts from the observation that some PQC algorithms have an intrinsic probabilistic behavior. We argue that this characteristic is a clear opportunity that paves the way for the application of approximate (or inexact) computing to the implementation of PQC cryptography.

5 October 2014 in Cryptography and Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
NMNadia El Mrabet
Nadia El Mrabet
JFJacques J. A. Fournier
Jacques J. A. Fournier
LGLouis Goubin
Louis Goubin
RLRonan Lashermes
Ronan Lashermes

1 December 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
MSMeriem Smache
Meriem Smache
NMNadia El Mrabet
Nadia El Mrabet
JGJesus-Javier Gilquijano
Jesus-Javier Gilquijano
ATAssia Tria
Assia Tria
EREmmanuel Riou
Emmanuel Riou
CGChaput Gregory
Chaput Gregory
We formalize in this work a model for node capture attack in a secure wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The adversary starts by overhearing exchanged messages to learn about the network because of all data transmissions nature (all in the air). Then, it has the physical access to the node, and with appropriate tools, it can read the secret information (like keys, programs, etc.) stored in the victim node memory. After that, we show how it removes that compromised node from the network and redeploys them for performing diverse attacks. Finally, we discuss a proposition of an intrusion detection system (IDS) to avoid this type of attacks.

1 September 2014
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RLRonan Lashermes
Ronan Lashermes
MPMarie Paindavoine
Marie Paindavoine
NMNadia El Mrabet
Nadia El Mrabet
JFJacques J.A. Fournier
Jacques J.A. Fournier
LGLouis Goubin
Louis Goubin
Pairing based cryptography (PBC) is touted as an efficient approach to address usability and privacy issues in the cyberspace. Like most cryptographic algorithms, PBC must be robust not only against theoretical cryptanalysis but also against practical physical attacks such as fault injections. The computation of the Tate pairing can be divided into two parts, the Miller Algorithm and the Final Exponentiation. In this paper, we describe practical implementations of fault attacks against the Miller Algorithm validating common fault models used against pairings. In the light of the implemented fault attacks, we show that some blinding techniques proposed to protect the algorithm against Side-Channels Analyses cannot be used as countermeasures against the implemented fault attacks.

1 May 2021 in Journal of Information Security and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ACasma chaouch
asma chaouch
LDLaurent-Stéphane Didier
Laurent-Stéphane Didier
FDFangan Yssouf Dosso
Fangan Yssouf Dosso
NMNadia El Mrabet
Nadia El Mrabet
BBBelgacem Bouallegue
Belgacem Bouallegue
BOBouraoui Ouni
Bouraoui Ouni

1 September 2017 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
AMAmine Mrabet
Amine Mrabet
NMNadia El Mrabet
Nadia El Mrabet
RLRonan Lashermes
Ronan Lashermes
JRJean-Baptiste Rigaud
Jean-Baptiste Rigaud
BBBelgacem Bouallegue
Belgacem Bouallegue
MMMohsen Machhout
Mohsen Machhout