The present study examined age differences in financial decision-making. Fourteen young adults and 14 older adults participated in a simulated Yard Sale, in which they were asked to sell a series of objects at the highest price possible when three offers were randomly and sequentially presented. In addition, participants performed a working memory task. No age differences were found in the total monetary earning, in spite of significant age differences in working memory capacities. Furthermore, both young and older adults used heuristic strategies in the Yard Sale task and outperformed computer simulations using a random guess strategy. Finally, older adults were more likely than young adults to use a single-deal strategy and were more consistent in using this "satisficing heuristic," perhaps to compensate for their reduced working memory capacities.
The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand belief have been classified as two exemplars of human misperceptions of random sequential events. This article examines the times of pattern occurrences where a fair or biased coin is tossed repeatedly. We demonstrate that, due to different pattern composition, two different statistics (mean time and waiting time) can arise from the same independent Bernoulli trials. When the coin is fair, the mean time is equal for all patterns of the same length but the waiting time is the longest for streak patterns. When the coin is biased, both mean time and waiting time change more rapidly with the probability of heads for a streak pattern than for a non-streak pattern. These facts might provide a new insight for understanding why people view streak patterns as rare and remarkable. The statistics of waiting time may not justify the prediction by the gambler’s fallacy, but paying attention to streaks in the hot hand belief appears to be meaningful in detecting the changes in the underlying process.
Significance: The human mind has a unique capacity to find order in chaos. The way the neocortex integrates information over time enables the mind to capture rich statistical structures embedded in random sequences. We show that a biologically motivated neural network model reacts to not only how often a pattern occurs (mean time) but also when a pattern is first encountered (waiting time). This behavior naturally produces the alternation bias in the gambler’s fallacy and provides a neural grounding for the Bayesian models of human behavior in randomness judgments. Our findings support a rational account for human probabilistic reasoning and a unifying perspective that connects the implicit learning without instruction with the generalization under structured and expressive rules.
It has been documented that when memorizing a physical space, the person's mental representation of that space is biased with distortion and segmentation. Two experiments reported here suggest that distortion and segmentation arise due to a hierarchical organization of the spatial representation. The spatial relations associated with salient landmarks are more strongly encoded and easier to recall than those associated with non-salient landmarks. In the presence of multiple salient landmarks, multiple intrinsic frames of reference are formed and spatial relations are anchored to each individual frame of reference. Multiple such representations may co-exist and interactively determine a person's spatial performance.