In recent years, many different versions of relational sociology have appeared. In this paper, I present a critical realist version developed since 1983, which is also called ‘relational theory of society’ (CRRS). It shares with the other relational sociologies the idea of avoiding both methodological individualism and holism. The main differences lie in the way social relations are defined, the kind of reality that is attributed to them, how they configure social formations, and the way in which their changes are conceived (morphogenesis and emergence). In particular, this approach is suitable to understand how the morphogenesis of society comes about through social relations, which are the connectors that mediate between agency and social structure. The generative mechanism that feeds social morphogenesis resides in the dynamic (that is, in their ways of operating) of the social relations networks that alter the social molecule constituting structures already in place. Social morphogenesis is a form of surplus of society with respect to itself. Society increases (or decreases) its potential for surplus depending on processes of valorization (or devalorization) of social relations.
30 March 2011 in International Review of Sociology
This paper deals with the issue of reflexivity in the different spheres of society, affected by the processes of globalization. The author argues that each sub-system of society is more or less differentiating itself according to a (prevailing) code or register of reflexivity. Global contextualism changes the way people manage the distinction between the particular and the universal (i.e. their perceived ‘different identities’) according to a plurality of reflexive processes. A differentiating universalism emerges within the different spheres of society (the market, the political system, the associational or third-sector system, and the system of families and informal primary networks). In principle, within these spheres many different codes of reflexivity can be detected. The four types of reflexivity detected by M.S. Archer can be correlated with the different spheres/sub-systems of society in order to see how the latter change their operations and overall configuration. In conclusion, it is shown that the thesis of ‘reflexive modernity’ is a reductive and an undifferentiated way of looking at what is happening in our globalizing society. The differentiation of reflexivity does not represent a further stage of modernity but, rather, it generates an ‘after-modern’ society through what the author calls ‘relational reflexivity’.
The article aims at clarifying the viewpoint of a critical realist relational sociology when dealing with the notion of ‘relational subject’. The term ‘relational subject’, as developed by Donati and Archer, The Relational Subject (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), indicates individual and social subjects as ‘relationally constituted’, i.e. in as much as they acquire qualities and powers through their internal and external social relations. The validity of the relational (not transactional, and not relationist) perspective can be seen on different levels in social ‘collective’ subjects: on the micro level (for example, in the couple relation), on the meso level (civil associations and organizations) and on the macro level (for example, in citizen/state relations).
Two sociological mainstreams, one based on rational choice theory and one on relational sociology, converge in affirming that relational goods are those that can be enjoyed only if shared with some others. Both agree that it is a kind of goods different from strictly private goods, which are enjoyed alone, and from standard public goods, which are enjoyed impersonally by any number. However, they differ in the way they understand the nature of these goods, how they are generated and what are their social consequences. For the theory of rational choice, they derive from the fact that individuals find gratification in sharing a certain relationship with other people, so that the aggregation of these propensities generates a local public good. According to relational sociology, instead, these goods are emergent sui generis relationships that are sought for their intrinsic value, as bearers of good life for those who share them. The author compares these different approaches, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. He concludes by claiming that relational goods have their own ontological status. They are produced by subjects who reflexively orient one towards the other to generate a relationship from which benefits derive for all those who participate in it.
Almost all empirical research reveals that social capital is a factor that enhances public goods, but scholars are divided into two strands of thought. According to the first strand, the enhancement of public goods does not need any network of social relations, while, according to the second, enhancement depends on the existence and good functioning of relational networks, to the point that it consists in the creation of social networks. Which one is right? In order to clarify the issue, one should ask: can a social relation have any added social value? If so, how can we conceive of the added social value of social relations, and how can we measure it? The author claims that the added social value of social relations can be observed in those processes through which social capital and public (relational) goods (re)generate or elide each other. These processes can be analyzed as morphogenetic cycles that work in temporal sequences and are not circular or recursive. By adopting this perspective, we can see and measure the added social value of social relations in primary and secondary networks, leading to the emergence of public goods. The relational approach can give abundant evidence as to how and why different public goods are produced and/or enhanced depending on the different added social value of the social relations that constitute them.