Les documents déclassifiés des plenums du Comité Central du PCUS. – La récente déclassification des transcriptions et autres documents des plenums du Comité Central du PCUS fournit une source nouvelle et abondante de renseignements sur toute la période soviétique, en particulier la période post-stalinienne. Du vivant de Stalin, les réunions du Comité Central furent très rares (surtout après les années 1930) mais, après sa mort, elles devinrent plus fréquentes et traitèrent parfois de sujets très controversés. Bien que toutes les décisions essentielles de la période post-stalinienne fussent prises par le Présidium du PCUS (Politbjuro) et le Secrétariat, le Comité Central jouait toutefois un rôle complémentaire important. De plus, les comptes rendus des plenums du Comité Central qui sont accessibles ainsi que les documents relatifs à ces séances parus récemment éclairent les motivations qui guidaient les décisions du Présidium et du Secrétariat. Ces documents fournissent des témoignages précieux aux chercheurs qui s’intéressent à la politique intérieure, aux luttes pour le pouvoir, et à la politique extérieure de l’URSS.
2 January 2025 in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation – commonly known as the Warsaw Pact – was a robust military alliance that deployed vast numbers of combat forces against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The Pact not only was capable of waging a large-scale war in Europe but was also an instrument of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, safeguarding loyal Communist regimes. In addition, the alliance over the years had become an effective mechanism of political coordination and consultation. In late April 1985, Gorbachev and the other Warsaw Pact leaders met in Warsaw on the 30th anniversary of the Pact and agreed to renew it for another 30 years. Yet only 6 years later, in mid-1991, the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded, having been rendered obsolete by the political transformation of Eastern Europe. Drawing on declassified archival documents, memoirs and published sources from the countries of the former Soviet bloc, this article provides a survey of the Warsaw Pact's final years and explains why the organisation ceased to exist in 1991. The article sets this process in the broader context of the reorientation of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Because major changes in military structures and deployments can often take years to carry out, the Warsaw Pact was still largely intact by the time the upheavals of 1989 in Eastern Europe altered the entire political complexion of the Soviet bloc and undermined the raison d'être of the alliance. Despite Moscow's efforts in 1990 to preserve the Warsaw Pact and to convert it into a mainly political forum, the fate of the organisation was sealed by the events of 1989.
The Soviet Union, like the large, multiethnic land empires in Europe that came to an end in the early 20th century (Habsburg, Imperial Russian, Ottoman), consisted of a central government ruling over far-flung regions in which particular ethnic and cultural groups were predominant. For many years, Soviet leaders were able to maintain the internal stability of the multiethnic Soviet state by relying on a mix of extreme coercion and occasional concessions to local demands. Soon after Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, he adopted sweeping political liberalization and democratization, including the first free elections ever held in the USSR. The loosening of political control in a state that had long been known for brutal repression had far-reaching consequences for social stability. The political opportunities that opened for ethnic groups in the Soviet Union to push for far-reaching change, including independence, created great difficulty for Gorbachev’s attempts to hold the Soviet Union together. Although he could have resorted to the use of large-scale violence as previous Soviet leaders had repeatedly done, he was deeply reluctant to cause mass bloodshed. His aversion to the use of mass repression was one of the key factors that precipitated the unraveling of the USSR. This article presents an in-depth analysis of Gorbachev’s responses to ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union from 1986 through 1991.