Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are innovative techniques for learning generative models of complex data distributions from samples. Despite remarkable improvements in generating realistic images, one of their major shortcomings is the fact that in practice, they tend to produce samples with little diversity, even when trained on diverse datasets. This phenomenon, known as mode collapse, has been the main focus of several recent advances in GANs. Yet there is little understanding of why mode collapse happens and why recently-proposed approaches mitigate mode collapse. We propose a principled approach to handle mode collapse called packing. The main idea is to modify the discriminator to make decisions based on multiple samples from the same class, either real or artificially generated. We borrow analysis tools from binary hypothesis testing—in particular the seminal result of Blackwell 2—to prove a fundamental connection between packing and mode collapse. We show that packing naturally penalizes generators with mode collapse, thereby favoring generator distributions with less mode collapse during the training process. Numerical experiments on benchmark datasets suggests that packing provides significant improvements in practice as well.
Anonymous social media platforms, like Secret, Yik Yak, and Whisper, have emerged as important tools for sharing ideas without the fear of judgment. Such anonymous platforms are also important in nations under authoritarian rule, where freedom of expression and the personal safety of message that authors may depend on anonymity. Whether for fear of judgment or retribution, it is sometimes crucial to hide the identities of users who post sensitive messages. In this paper, we consider a global adversary who wishes to identify the author of a message; it observes either a snapshot of the spread of a message at a certain time or sampled timestamp metadata, or both. Recent advances in rumor source detection show that existing messaging protocols are vulnerable against such an adversary. We introduce a novel messaging protocol, which we call adaptive diffusion, and show that under the snapshot adversarial model, adaptive diffusion spreads content fast and achieves perfect obfuscation of the source when the underlying contact network is an infinite regular tree. That is, all users with the message are nearly equally likely to have been the origin of the message. When the contact network is an irregular tree, we characterize the probability of maximum likelihood detection by proving a concentration result over Galton-Watson trees. Experiments on a sampled Facebook network demonstrate that adaptive diffusion effectively hides the location of the source even when the graph is finite, is irregular, and has cycles.
18 September 2015 in IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks
Multiresolution analysis is important for understanding graph signals, which represent graph-structured data. Wavelet filterbanks permit multiscale analysis and processing of graph signals-particularly, useful for harvesting large-scale data. Inspired by first-order spline wavelets in classical signal processing, we introduce two-channel (low-pass and high-pass) wavelet filterbanks for graph signals. This class of filterbanks boasts several useful properties, such as critical sampling, perfect reconstruction, and graph invariance. We consider an application in graph semi-supervised learning and propose a wavelet-regularized semi-supervised learning algorithm that is competitive for certain synthetic and real-world data.
9 June 2020 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Payment channel networks (PCNs) are viewed as one of the most promising scalability solutions for cryptocurrencies today. Roughly, PCNs are networks where each node represents a user and each directed, weighted edge represents funds escrowed on a blockchain; these funds can be transacted only between the endpoints of the edge. Users efficiently transmit funds from node A to B by relaying them over a path connecting A to B, as long as each edge in the path contains enough balance (escrowed funds) to support the transaction. Whenever a transaction succeeds, the edge weights are updated accordingly. In deployed PCNs, channel balances (i.e., edge weights) are not revealed to users for privacy reasons; users know only the initial weights at time 0. Hence, when routing transactions, users typically first guess a path, then check if it supports the transaction. This guess-and-check process dramatically reduces the success rate of transactions. At the other extreme, knowing full channel balances can give substantial improvements in transaction success rate at the expense of privacy. In this work, we ask whether a network can reveal noisy channel balances to trade off privacy for utility. We show fundamental limits on such a tradeoff, and propose noise mechanisms that achieve the fundamental limit for a general class of graph topologies. Our results suggest that in practice, PCNs should operate either in the low-privacy or low-utility regime; it is not possible to get large gains in utility by giving up a little privacy, or large gains in privacy by sacrificing a little utility.
19 May 2023 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Most permissionless blockchain networks run on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, which offer flexibility and decentralization at the expense of performance (e.g., network latency). Historically, this tradeoff has not been a bottleneck for most blockchains. However, an emerging host of blockchain-based applications (e.g., decentralized finance) are increasingly sensitive to latency; users who can reduce their network latency relative to other users can accrue (sometimes significant) financial gains. In this work, we initiate the study of strategic latency reduction in blockchain P2P networks. We first define two classes of latency that are of interest in blockchain applications. We then show empirically that a strategic agent who controls only their local peering decisions can manipulate both types of latency, achieving 60% of the global latency gains provided by the centralized, paid service bloXroute, or, in targeted scenarios, comparable gains. Finally, we show that our results are not due to the poor design of existing P2P networks. Under a simple network model, we theoretically prove that an adversary can always manipulate the P2P network's latency to their advantage, provided the network experiences sufficient peer churn and transaction activity.