A new experimental paradigm involving a computerised quiz was used to examine, on an intra-individual level, the strength of association between four components of the surprise syndrome: cognitive (degree of prospectively estimated unexpectedness), experiential (the feeling of surprise), behavioural (degree of response delay on a parallel task), and expressive (the facial expression of surprise). It is argued that this paradigm, together with associated methods of data analysis, effectively controls for most method factors that could in previous studies have lowered the correlations among the components of emotion syndromes. It was found that (a) the components of the surprise syndrome were all positively correlated; (b) strong association existed only between the cognitive and the experiential component of surprise; (c) the coherence between syndrome components did not increase with increasing intensity of surprise; and (d) there was also only moderate coherence between the components of the facial expression of surprise (eyebrow raising, eye widening, mouth opening), although in this case, coherence tended to increase with intensity. Taken together, the findings support only a weakly probabilistic version of a behavioural syndrome view of surprise. However, the component correlations seem strong enough to support the existence of strong associations among a subset of the mental or central neurophysiological processes engaged in surprise.

Evidence on the coherence between emotion and facial expression in adults from laboratory experiments is reviewed. High coherence has been found in several studies between amusement and smiling; low to moderate coherence between other positive emotions and smiling. The available evidence for surprise and disgust suggests that these emotions are accompanied by their “traditional” facial expressions, and even components of these expressions, only in a minority of cases. Evidence concerning sadness, anger, and fear is very limited. For sadness, one study suggests that high emotion–expression coherence may exist in specific situations, whereas for anger and fear, the evidence points to low coherence. Insufficient emotion intensity and inhibition of facial expressions seem unable to account for the observed dissociations between emotion and facial expression.

R. E. Thayer (1989) proposed 2 types of activation: energetic arousal (awake-tired) and tense arousal (tense-calm). This view has been challenged by claims that energetic arousal and tense arousal are mixtures of valence and a single activation dimension. The authors present a direct test of this hypothesis by computing the correlation between the residuals of energetic arousal and tense arousal after removing the shared variance with valence. Whereas the valence activation hypothesis predicts a strong positive correlation between the 2 residuals, the authors found that it was not significantly different from 0. This finding reaffirms the view of energetic arousal and tense arousal as 2 distinct types of activation.

Schwarz and Clore (1983) proposed that the effects of mood on evaluative judgements are due to people's use of a “feeling heuristic”. Results of the present study suggest that this heuristic is particularly likely to be used under conditions of reduced processing capacity, induced by time pressure and competing task demands, as both factors intensified the effects of mood on evaluative judgements. In addition, previous findings that increasing the salience of a judgement-irrelevant cause disrupts the effects of mood on evaluative judgements were replicated. All of these effects were, however, obtained only when mood was salient to the participants, suggesting that to be effective, mood must exceed a threshold of salience. Taken together, the findings further support the hypothesis that at least in some situations, the effects of moods on evaluative judgements are based on a controlled inference strategy, rather than on automatic priming effects.