The principle of sustainability is generally taken as a good, but what does sustainability really mean? The notion of sustainability has been at the center of global governance debates for more than a decade and many countries across the world include sustainability in their constitutions. This paper argues that in order to understand the concept of sustainability in a constitutional context, we need to turn to the notion of dignity. The paper explores the concepts of sustainability and dignity and their meanings in the framework of climate justice and related questions and by discussing them in the context of Kantian and republican theory. In addition, the paper looks at intriguing court cases on the importance of nation states meeting their climate law duties. The paper concludes by exploring new uses of the sustainability concept. EU constitutional law will serve as a laboratory in testing these questions.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has changed the framework and possibilities of the development of European Union (EU) criminal law. Gone is the long-lived and awkward cross-pillar character of EU criminal law, as mainly a third pillar EU ‘intergovernmental’ issue but also partly a first (EC) pillar question. The Lisbon Treaty marks a new era for the criminal law as it brings it within the core of the EU law project. Nevertheless, Article 10 of the transitional protocol as attached to the Lisbon Treaty stipulates a five-year transition period before former third pillar instruments will be treated in the same way as EU acts. This paper will focus on two issues in particular. The first question that will be addressed concerns what EU law principles drive or decide the EU's involvement in criminal law. After having identified these principles the second question is whether they should drive it and if so what implications will it have for the criminal law in the future.
The COVID-19 pandemic has raised many intriguing questions both in the EU and globally, from the critical task of safeguarding lives to technical legal issues about competences to regulate health as well as the boundaries of emergency laws. This paper is interested in the connection between non-domination theory and the EU’s constitutional structure in the context of emergency laws. A key theme of the paper is that risk and emergencies are nothing new in an EU context, but concepts used by the legislator in a wide range of policy areas which give rise to a number of constitutional challenges. The paper sketches out the main characteristics of non-domination and republication theory and addresses the question of how and why the notion of non-domination may be useful for understanding the EU constitutionalism venture in the framework of risk and emergency laws.
This paper challenges established visions of EU legal enforcement by testing them in the context of criminal law theory and asks to what extent EU law can be enforced against non-compliant Member States via the use of criminal law. A main theme running through this article is the basic question of the extent to which the EU legislator needs criminal law provisions for the enforcement of EU law. The paper does this by looking at the effect of administrative sanctions and their link to criminal law sanctions. In addition, the article assesses the wider theoretical implications for the enforcement of EU law through criminal law and specifically when the values of the EU and those of the Member States are in conflict. Critically, the paper asks if the EU enforcement toolkit is sufficiently nuanced when applied in a criminal law context and sets out to chart the genesis of EU law enforcement through the use of criminal law theory. This seems particularly relevant to the discussion of enforcement in general, given that the operation of EU law essentially and chiefly concerns the values to be enforced in the national arena.
If the state outsources a responsibility to private actors to plant trees, is that necessarily a bad thing? Surely, one would think not. Still, in constitutional theory, there are many forceful arguments against privatisation. One of the core arguments against privatisation is the question of who ought to do what and what it means for a policy area to be inherently public. In this paper, I am interested in varieties of privatisation and in particular what privatisation means in the context of climate change. The aim of the paper is to show that precisely because there is a variety of privatisation, in some areas, such as the environment and regarding climate change, we may discuss the question of ‘duty’ rather than privatisation as such.
This paper argues that the EU’s culture of justification in law should be expanded beyond traditional human rights rhetoric to incorporate a deeper sense of solidarity and sympathy for other species. By critically examining how the EU and Member States currently justify their actions in the area of human rights, and supported by practical examples across various EU policy areas, it becomes clear that adopting a broader vocabulary rooted in solidarity and sympathy —drawing on Richard Rorty’s scholarship—can strengthen the legitimacy of the EU project and its values. Furthermore, integrating a culture of sympathy for all living beings fosters a more comprehensive approach to justice, highlighting the importance of understanding and re-thinking reciprocity in human rights law and urging a shift towards a more inclusive legal framework.