Nacim NAIT MOHAND

Dr. Nacim NAIT MOHAND


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 October 2023 in HAL
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AHAbdelhakim Hammoudi
Abdelhakim Hammoudi
MRMohammed Said Radjef
Mohammed Said Radjef
NMNacim NAIT MOHAND
Nacim NAIT MOHAND
NNNacim Nait
Nacim Nait
Why do some firms adopt food safety standards, while others comply only with government regulations? This article argues that among the parameters companies consider is consumer behavior in the event of a health crisis. Drawing on simple game theory concepts, we propose an analysis that explains the role of consumer profiles and corporate doctrine in their decision-making and in the emergence of food safety standards.

8 September 2026 in AppliedMath
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NMNacim NAIT MOHAND
Nacim NAIT MOHAND
HLHocine Lehouche
Hocine Lehouche
This paper addresses loop-wise PI/PID controller structure selection in a coupled two-tank hydraulic system. Existing studies generally prescribe controller architectures or compare predefined configurations after synthesis, leaving this problem insufficiently explored when each choice depends energetically on the neighboring loop. Although exact feedback linearization decouples the auxiliary tracking dynamics, the reconstructed physical pump inputs retain nonlinear hydraulic coupling. Consequently, reducing the control energy of one loop may increase the effort required by the other, creating conflicting local objectives that motivate a non-cooperative game-theoretic formulation. The plant is feedback-linearized, PI and PID controllers are parameterized by pole placement, and their assignment is posed as a finite static game in which each player minimizes pump energy cost. For the nominal symmetric configuration, (PID, PID) is the unique Nash equilibrium, although (PI, PI) yields a lower aggregate control energy cost (291.4134 vs. 291.8184), showing that unilateral optimality does not coincide with collective energy minimization. PID reduces settling time from 5.253 s to 3.422 s (34.9%) but increases maximum overshoot from 13.55% to 20.82% (53.7%). Sensitivity analyses show that tuning, leakage, coupling, and initial conditions can reverse best responses, while a ±10% parametric mismatch analysis preserves convergent tracking with small steady-state errors, although the equilibrium may change.

15 October 2025 in HAL
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NMNacim NAIT MOHAND
Nacim NAIT MOHAND
MRMohammed Said Radjef
Mohammed Said Radjef
AHAbdelhakim Hammoudi
Abdelhakim Hammoudi
This study presents a decision-support tool designed for the regulation of food fraud, based on on hybridizing of four approaches: i) an economic model inspired by the Chinese milk crisis, opposing a food firm and a public authority. The model integrates the main hypotheses of food fraud mechanisms, considering organoleptic standards, production and compliance costs, the firm's ability to substitute the required nutrient with a less expensive chemical substance, as well as the cost of acquiring that substance. It also considers the probability of a health crisis occurring, the financial penalty stipulated by regulations, the overall health risk, and the expected profits based on the firm's different strategic choices; ii) A sequential game where the authority first chooses the nutritional standard and the fine applicable in case of a health crisis to minimize health risk, and then the firm determines its optimal compliance level to maximize its expected profit. The game is solved by backward induction; iii) the DCA method to locally solve step 2 of the game, and iv) The ML model (CaatBoost) to estimate the firm's best response function for solving step 1 of the game. The experimental results of the tool demonstrate that the organoleptic standard primarily drives firm's compliance. Strict nutritional standards are effective to reduce health risk only when paired with high fines. Optimal regulation is adaptive: when production capacity, prices, or organoleptic standards are low, maximum standards and fines are required; otherwise,relaxing the standard best limits health risks.