As a kind of proof of the rights and interests of forest resources, the implementation of forest ticket is an important measure for China to revitalise collective forest land resources and promote the transformation of forest resources into economic development advantages, which is of great significance to the sustainable development of forestry. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game method of multiple subjects, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of state-owned forest farms, village collective economic organisations, and forest farmers; analyses their strategy choices and the stability of the equilibrium point of the game system; and examines the influence of different parameter values on the model strategy evolution through combination with numerical simulation methods. The results show that the level of knowledge and participation in the forest ticket system significantly influence the optimal equilibrium strategy of each subject of forest cooperative management. The optimal strategy is only when the evolution of the game model is stable at a high level of input, participation, and high willingness to participate. In addition, the forest market environment and the level of inputs from the agents also affect the rate of stabilisation of behavioural strategies.