Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study the mechanisms governing dynamic changes in relational and contractual governance at different stages of government-funded mega construction projects (MCPs) by studying their different effects on project performance and participants’ opportunism.Design/methodology/approach: Partial least squares structural equation modeling was used to test eight hypotheses based on data collected from 147 respondents in different participating organizations in Chinese MCPs.Findings: First, contractual governance has a stronger positive impact on project performance than relational governance in the early stage of MCPs, while relational governance exerts more positive effects on project performance than contractual governance in the middle and late stages. Second, opportunism is a mediator variable between governance mechanisms and project performance, and relational governance is more effective than contractual governance in restricting opportunism.Originality/value: In contrast to a static analysis of project governance mechanisms, this study examines dynamic changes in the governance mechanisms of MCPs in the Chinese context by considering the mediating role of opportunism as well as guanxi as an element of relational governance, thus filling in gaps in the literature on MCP governance and contributing to the development of MCP management theory.

Purpose: The low success rate of megaprojects stems from the opportunism triggered by uncertainty. Developing trust between participants is an effective means to reduce uncertainty, but this process is inevitably affected by contracts. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of uncertainty on participants’ opportunism in megaprojects and the effect of trust on reducing uncertainty. At the same time, the moderating effects of contractual control are tested.Design/methodology/approach: This research classifies trust into competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust and categorizes uncertainty into environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. Partial least squares structural equation modeling is used to test the hypotheses based on data collected from 172 respondents.Findings: The results show a positive correlation between the two types of uncertainty and opportunism. For the governance of uncertainty, competence-based trust can reduce environmental uncertainty, but it is ineffective for behavioral uncertainty, and goodwill-based trust has a significant effect on both types of uncertainty. The test of moderating effects shows that contractual control strengthens the effect of competence-based trust but weakens the effect of goodwill-based trust, which means that contractual control complements competence-based trust and substitutes for goodwill-based trust.Research limitations/implications: This research enriches the theory of megaproject management. First, it validates the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Second, this study clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust.Practical implications: For practice, this research provides some implications for megaproject management. First, project managers should recognize that the match between trust and project uncertainty is key to the success of megaproject governance. For example, some megaprojects involve many organizations, and there are many difficulties in behavioral supervision and performance appraisal. Therefore, developing goodwill-based trust between participants through positive interactions is an effective means to reduce the behavioral uncertainty of all participants and to curb opportunistic behaviors.Originality/value: This research validated the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Furthermore, it clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust.

To improve the success rate of megaprojects from a relational perspective, we analyzed the factors that affect relational quality in megaprojects and the impact of relational quality on megaproject success. Based on survey data from 172 respondents, partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was used to test the proposed structural model. The results show that in the case of low-level incentives, asset specificity and uncertainty have a negative impact on relational quality. Further, goodwill-based trust, competence-based trust and dependence have a positive effect on relational quality. However, in the case of high-level incentives, the negative impact of uncertainty on relational quality disappears, and the effect of asset specificity on relational quality becomes positive. In addition, this study validates the role of relational quality in promoting megaproject success; surprisingly, the moderating role of incentive level is not significant. These findings can help project managers improve megaproject success with the relational method and provide an inspiration for engineering managers to re-evaluate the effectiveness of incentives.

Trust and control are the two main governance mechanisms in megaprojects. However, the role of social exchange norms in trust and control governance remains unclear. Based on social exchange theory, we explored the impact of control and trust on megaproject success by considering the mediating effect of social exchange norms, which include reciprocity, negotiation, and information sharing. Partial least squares structural equation modeling was used to test the hypotheses based on data collected from 155 respondents. Results show that control and trust have positive effects on megaproject success. Trust can promote social exchange norms. That is, the higher the level of trust is, the greater the likelihood that reciprocity, negotiation, and information sharing will increase. Control does not have a significant impact on social exchange norms. Social exchange norms have a mediating effect on the relationship between trust and megaproject success but not on the link between control and megaproject success. Our findings fill in the gaps in the literature on megaproject governance and contribute to the development of megaproject management theory, which can help project managers understand the motivation orientations of all parties to make decisions wisely and rationally under complex environments.

Based on the theory of Planned Behavior, this study firstly explored the relationship between the behavioral intention and the actual behavior of consumers and real estate enterprises when choosing prefabricated residential buildings. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) was adopted, being supported by the questionnaire data from 310 respondents of 14 prefabricated building demonstration cities in China, to achieve the purpose. The results show that there is a gap between the behavioral intention and the actual behavior of consumers and real estate enterprises. The moderating effect of reputational incentive policies and financial incentive policies was examined to bridge the gap. It shows that reputational incentive policies and financial incentive policies are an effective way in promoting the behavioral intention and actual behavior of real estate enterprises when adopting prefabricated residential buildings, but they all do not work for consumers. The findings can help government understand the preference of consumers and real estate enterprises, so as to use governance incentive policies more wisely and rationally under various circumstances.

Mega construction project governance is an evolutionary process characterized by high transaction costs and complex interrelationships. Based on transaction cost theory, relational contract theory and evolutionary governance theory, this study explored the impact of evolutionary project governance on mega construction project performance by collectively considering the mediating effect of transaction costs and the moderating effect of a relational contract. Partial least squares structural equation modeling was used to test the hypotheses based on data collected from 176 respondents. The results show that evolutionary project governance would be more effective in increasing project performance and reducing transaction costs in the context of a relational contract. Reducing transaction costs is an effective way to improve project performance, and it is an important mediation variable between evolutionary project governance and project performance in the context of a relational contract. The results enrich the theory on mega construction project governance and reduce the imbalance between theory and practice in previous studies.