Haozhe Zhou

Dr. Haozhe Zhou

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 August 2026 in Future Internet
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HZHaozhe Zhou
Haozhe Zhou
HLHang Lei
Hang Lei
MYMaolin Yang
Maolin Yang
Zero-trust security continuously re-evaluates the trustworthiness of industrial devices and reacts by rerouting, isolating, or rescheduling traffic. In a time-sensitive network (TSN) that carries feedback control loops, however, every such reaction is itself a control-plane disturbance: a reroute that meets every deadline can still deliver stale measurements, and an optimizer that crashes mid-reconfiguration can leave the network in an undefined state. This paper presents ZTSafe, a scheduling architecture that treats physical safety—not attack blocking—as the object of guarantee. The guarantee has two distinct layers: compliance with the communication contract yields a deterministic invariance result conditional on the stated plant, disturbance, synchronization, and trusted-base assumptions, whereas the risk bound’s 1−δ coverage is an empirical probabilistic calibration result. ZTSafe (i) synthesizes, offline and per control loop, a communication safety contract that bounds delay, age of information (AoI), consecutive losses, jitter, and path risk such that the physical state remains in its safe set under those assumptions; (ii) converts zero-trust evidence into conservative risk upper bounds and couples the admissible path-risk budget to the runtime safety margin of the plant; and (iii) places the scheduling optimizer outside the trusted computing base: an independent runtime shield checks every proposed schedule against the contracts, and on solver timeout, crash, or infeasibility the system atomically switches to a pre-checked fallback instead of executing an unverified approximate solution. Here, “verified” means independently checked by the shield, not machine-verified; a systematic shield defect or compromise of the remaining trusted computing base voids the deterministic claim. On a hardware TSN testbed with three physical control loops and fourteen attack and fault scenarios, ZTSafe reduces safe-set violations by 92.9% relative to the strongest baseline (12.8% to 0.9%; two-proportion z=39.4, p<10−15) while sustaining 94.3% on-time completion of critical traffic, recovers within three control periods, and executes zero unverified configurations across 10,000 injected solver failures.

4 September 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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HZHaozhe Zhou
Haozhe Zhou
HLHang Lei
Hang Lei
MYMaolin Yang
Maolin Yang
Mobile industrial devices increasingly cross administrative domains. A maintenance terminal certified in one factory can be dispatched to another, while autonomous vehicles cross fog domains while reaching cloud digital twins. Existing solutions force a trade-off. Long-lived certificates expose a stable identity that every visited domain can track and that is clonable once a device is captured, while single-gateway token services concentrate issuing power in one trusted node and asynchronous revocation leaves an unquantified window in which a revoked device is still accepted. Here, we present HRCred, which converts hardware identities rooted in physical unclonable functions (PUFs) into domain-bound, epoch-bound, and threshold-issued short-lived pseudonymous credentials. A device proves possession of its reconstructed root key to its home domain using only symmetric primitives. A set of fog issuers jointly signs each credential with a t-of-n threshold BLS signature, so no coalition of fewer than t issuers can mint one. Finally, a monotonic revocation-epoch mechanism yields a configurable upper bound on how long a revoked credential can still be accepted, which we prove and validate. On constrained hardware, the device side costs 3.6 mJ (18.8 ms authentication and 5.4 ms verification, on par with the lightest single-gateway token) while resisting up to t−1 compromised issuers, cutting cross-domain linkage AUC to 0.55, and keeping all 12,000 measured post-revocation acceptances below the analytical bound.

8 September 2026 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HZHaozhe Zhou
Haozhe Zhou
HLHang Lei
Hang Lei
MYMaolin Yang
Maolin Yang
Large language models (LLMs) can turn a flood of cross-layer industrial logs into a fluent incident narrative, but a narrative that cites only real, resolvable events can still be wrong in every relation that matters: the login came from a different workstation, the write command occurred after the physical change it supposedly caused, the action fell inside a planned maintenance window, and the controller does not even actuate the affected process. A cited event is not necessarily supporting evidence. When such a narrative drives automated response, the error propagates into isolating the wrong controller or revoking a legitimate operator. We present EviGuard, a system that decides when an LLM’s understanding is trustworthy enough to act on. EviGuard stores auditable cross-layer evidence in a provenance graph, lets the LLM propose only hypotheses, compiles each hypothesis into atomic machine-checkable claims in an Incident Claim Language, and has an ensemble of deterministic verifiers label every claim supported, contradicted, or unknown against the graph—honoring interval time, event-time policy and credential versions, network reachability, and physical control dependencies. A response gate forbids any high-impact action whose critical preconditions are not all supported. On EviCPS-Bench (42 hardware-in-the-loop attack chains, 9600 claim-level labels, κ=0.87), EviGuard cuts the unsupported-claim rate from 12.6% to 1.7%, raises relation-edge F1 from 0.64 to 0.89, holds prompt-injection success to 0.4%, and executes zero unverified high-impact actions across 3200 response decisions, at a median end-to-end latency of 0.44 s.

29 May 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HZHaozhe Zhou
Haozhe Zhou
HLHang Lei
Hang Lei
FHFeng HONG
Feng HONG
YPYuegang Pu
Yuegang Pu
NDNan Deng
Nan Deng
MYMaolin Yang
Maolin Yang
The pervasive adoption of Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, QUIC (UDP-based multiplexed secure transport), and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) renders over 95% of network traffic opaque to deep packet inspection, fundamentally challenging device fingerprinting and state detection in enterprise and home networks. Existing encrypted traffic analysis methods relying solely on network metadata degrade by more than 30% under multi-device concurrency, traffic shaping defenses, and noisy labels, exposing a critical gap: the absence of an orthogonal information source that persists independently of encryption protocol evolution. This paper presents SilentDNS, a cross-modal inference framework that fuses ambient acoustic side-channel signals with encrypted network traffic metadata for device fingerprinting and operational state detection without decryption. Unlike prior acoustic side-channel work that treats sound as an attack vector, SilentDNS is the first to leverage device acoustic emissions as an auxiliary defensive channel, aligned with network observations through a weak-supervision InfoNCE contrastive mechanism requiring only coarse window-level labels. Evaluated across 12 device types in three environments, SilentDNS achieves 96.3% macro-F1 in device fingerprinting (+8.7 pp over the best network-only baseline) and 93.1% in state detection, with gains of up to 22.4 pp on I/O-intensive events. Under state-of-the-art traffic padding defenses, SilentDNS recovers 71% of the accuracy lost by network-only classifiers, demonstrating that cross-modal physical–digital fusion provides an observation channel fundamentally harder for adversaries to suppress than network-layer features alone. SilentDNS, a cross-modal framework that fuses ambient acoustic side-channel signals with encrypted network traffic metadata for device fingerprinting and state detection without decryption. SilentDNS exploits the observation that devices emit characteristic acoustic signatures (fan speed, hard disk drive (HDD) seeks, relay clicks) temporally correlated with network behavior—signals that persist regardless of encryption evolution. A contrastive alignment mechanism operates under weak, window-level supervision, and an integrated explanation engine generates human-readable evidence chains for SOC workflows. Across 12 device types in three environments, SilentDNS achieves 96.3% macro-F1 for fingerprinting (+8.7 pp over the best network-only baseline) and 93.1% for state detection (+22.4 pp on I/O-intensive events). Under traffic padding defenses, SilentDNS recovers 71% of accuracy lost by network-only classifiers.