Yangke Ding

Dr. Yangke Ding

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
24 April 2020 in International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YDYangke Ding
Yangke Ding
MJMingzhou Jin
Mingzhou Jin
SLSen Li
Sen Li
DFDingzhong Feng
Dingzhong Feng
Smart logistics is an effective way to meet the challenges of fast-changing customer expectations, take opportunities brought by new technologies, and facilitate new business models. This review paper systematically summarises the recent research and applications of smart logistics based on the internet of things (IoT), including smart freight transportation, warehousing, and delivery. A bibliometric analysis based on publications between 2008 and 2019 reveals main technologies and impacts of the research and applications of IoT-based smart logistics and their industrial and geographic distributions. The content analysis demonstrates the role and impact of IoT on smart logistics, reveals challenges of IoT-based smart logistics, and provides research needs for the development of smart logistics. The current challenges include technical problems of radio frequency identification and wireless sensor networks, limited extension and technical capacity of IoT,standardisation issues of IoT, data acquisition and processing issues of IoT, and security and privacy concerns on IoT. There is a strong research need to address the key technical issues of IoT, promote various IoT technologies in logistics practice, and jointly develop advanced information and communications technologies and management systems.

1 July 2019 in International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YWYaliang Wang
Yaliang Wang
YDYangke Ding
Yangke Ding
Guoda ChenGuoda Chen
Guoda Chen
SJShousong Jin
Shousong Jin

DFDingzhong Feng
Dingzhong Feng
LMLei Ma
Lei Ma
YDYangke Ding
Yangke Ding
GWGuanghua Wu
Guanghua Wu
YZYe Zhang
Ye Zhang
Considering the preference of green consumers for remanufactured products, a dual-sale-channel supply chain model with government non-intervention, government remanufacturing subsidy policy, and carbon tax policy is constructed, respectively. The difference of the optimal decision between the firm and the government under the two policies is discussed in this paper. Meanwhile, we analyze the influence of green consumers on the government’s optimal decision, based on social welfare maximization. It is found that without government intervention, social welfare is the lowest. The carbon tax policy is better when the proportion of green consumers and the environmental coefficient are extreme or moderate at the same time. Otherwise, the subsidy policy is better. The carbon tax policy is more effective than the subsidy policy in controlling carbon emissions. Profit-sharing contracts should be established by enterprises and governments to achieve win–win results.

1 December 2020 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YDYangke Ding
Yangke Ding
CSChao Shen
Chao Shen
DFDingzhong Feng
Dingzhong Feng

12 December 2018 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YDYangke Ding
Yangke Ding
LMLei Ma
Lei Ma
YZYe Zhang
Ye Zhang
DFDingzhong Feng
Dingzhong Feng
The aim of this paper is to discuss the coopetition (cooperative competition) relationship between a manufacturer and a collector in the collection of waste mobile phones (WMPs) and examine the evolution mechanism and the internal reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for their collection strategies. A coopetition evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory was developed to obtain their common and evolutional collection strategies. The pure-strategy Nash equilibriums of this model were obtained which showed their collection strategy choices of perfect competition or cooperation. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was obtained which revealed evolution trends and laws. In addition, the optimal RPM was obtained in the sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The example of WMPs in China was taken to examine the simulation of the RPM. Results show that (i) although the manufacturer and the collector may change their strategies of cooperation and competition over time, cooperation is their best choice to increase payoffs; (ii) the optimal RPM is beneficial to propel their cooperation tendency and then to increase their payoffs.

6 December 2019 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DFDingzhong Feng
Dingzhong Feng
XYXinghui Yu
Xinghui Yu
YMYongbo Mao
Yongbo Mao
YDYangke Ding
Yangke Ding
YZYe Zhang
Ye Zhang
ZPZhiyan Pan
Zhiyan Pan
Considering the reverse logistics system composed of two manufacturers and two recyclers under the cross-competitive take-back mode, which is influenced by multiple factors (industry competition, economies of scale, government subsidies, remanufacturing rate, etc.), a model for remanufacturing reverse logistics system based on Stackelberg game is established. Then, the Nash equilibrium solution of decision variables is solved to obtain the best profit of all participants under the cross-competitive take-back mode. Furthermore, the parameter constraint analysis is carried out, and the monopolistic take-back mode is introduced for comparative analysis. Then, the sensitivity analysis of the model is carried out. At last, a case analysis is carried out based on the current situation of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling in China. The results show that the cross-competitive take-back mode is more advantageous to all participants in the reverse logistics system than the monopolistic take-back mode. Recyclers should actively sign contracts with multiple manufacturers to recycle waste products, making full use of the advantages of cross-competitive take-back mode to maximize the profits of all participants, so as to encourage them to recycle waste products and achieve sustainable development.