Li Kenan

Li Kenan


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 August 2023 in Mathematics
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Journal Article
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XLXin Li
Xin Li
LKLi Kenan
Li Kenan
YLYongjian Li
Yongjian Li
In the modern catering business model, restaurants usually use established platforms to promote their food and use two channels to sell their food: online and offline sales. We construct demand functions for online and offline, considering promotion and substitution relationships by a revised Bertrand model. We first consider three classic models: the decentralized decision model, the equilibrium decision model, and the centralized decision model. In the decentralized decision model, the platform decides both the promotional effort and the online discount; in the equilibrium decision model, the platform decides the online discount, while the food service provider decides the promotional effort. In the centralized decision model, the takeaway platform and the food service provider have maximized the overall profit as the decisive goal. We find that the online discount decreases in price when the impact factor of the online promotion is high but increases in price when the impact factor of the online promotion is low. Then, we analyze and compare the results under three models. We find that when the substitution factor is low enough, or the impactor factor of online promotion is low enough, the global optimal platform discount is higher than the equilibrium platform discount and the decentralized online discount; otherwise, the results are the opposite. In addition, the global optimal promotional effort is always higher than the optimal promotional effort in the decentralized model. When the substitution factor is low enough, or the impactor factor of online promotion is low enough, the global optimal promotional effort is higher than the equilibrium optimal promotional effort; otherwise, the result is the opposite.

1 September 2026 in Mathematics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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YLYupeng Liang
Yupeng Liang
YZYihe Zhang
Yihe Zhang
LKLi Kenan
Li Kenan
ZTZhang Tao
Zhang Tao
With the rapid development of internet technology, live-streaming sales have emerged as a new form of online shopping and gradually become an important channel for consumer purchases. This paper investigates the decision-making problem in a dual-channel supply chain under the live-streaming sales model, focusing on the optimal decisions and profit distribution between the retailer and live-streamer when a Valuation Adjustment Mechanism (VAM) is in place. We construct a dual-channel supply chain model consisting of a retailer and a live-streamer, then analyze the decision-making and profits under three scenarios: centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making without VAM, and decentralized decision-making with VAM. The results show that the proper use of a VAM can increase the profits of all supply chain participants; furthermore, different sales target-setting methods should be adopted for products with different price levels. The sales target serves as the core of the incentive mechanism and directly influences the streamer’s effort and pricing strategies. When formulating sales strategies, retailers and live-streamers should comprehensively consider the decision-making structure, the incentives and risks associated with using a VAM, and the coordinated development of multiple channels to maximize overall supply chain profits.