Body-awareness relies on the representation of both interoceptive and exteroceptive percepts coming from one's body. However, the exact relationship and possible interaction of interoceptive and exteroceptive systems for body-awareness remain unknown. We sought to understand for the first time, to our knowledge, the interaction between interoceptive and exteroceptive awareness of the body. First, we measured interoceptive awareness with an established heartbeat monitoring task. We, then, used a multi-sensory-induced manipulation of body-ownership (e.g. Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI)) and we quantified the extent to which participants experienced ownership over a foreign body-part using behavioural, physiological and introspective measures. The results suggest that interoceptive sensitivity predicts the malleability of body representations, that is, people with low interoceptive sensitivity experienced a stronger illusion of ownership in the RHI. Importantly, this effect was not simply owing to a poor proprioceptive representation or differences in autonomic states of one's body prior to the multi-sensory stimulation, suggesting that interoceptive awareness modulates the online integration of multi-sensory body-percepts.

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.

Previous studies have indicated that largely overlapping parts of a complex, mainly fronto-parietal, neural network are activated during both observation and execution of an action. If these two processes are inextricably linked, increases of neural activity contingent upon action observation should be found only for movements that can actually be performed. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated whether observation of possible and biomechanically impossible movements of fingers activated the same neural systems. Thirteen healthy subjects were scanned during observation of video-clips showing abduction/adduction movements of the right index or the little finger, which were defined as biomechanically possible or impossible according to the range of their angular displacement at the metacarpo-phalangeal joint. The mere observation of possible and impossible hand movements induced a selective activation of left precentral and left inferior frontal regions, thus indicating that motor-related areas map body actions even when they violate the constraints of human anatomy. An increase of the blood oxygen level-dependent signal selectively linked to observation of impossible hand movements was found in sensorimotor parietal regions. Our results suggest that while premotor areas code human actions regardless of whether they are biologically possible or impossible, sensorimotor parietal regions may be important for coding the plausibility of actions.