A model for the spread of an infection is analyzed for different population structures. The interactions within the population are described by small world networks, ranging from ordered lattices to random graphs. For the more ordered systems, there is a fluctuating endemic state of low infection. At a finite value of the disorder of the network, we find a transition to self-sustained oscillations in the size of the infected subpopulation.

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different topologies, ranging from regular lattices to random graphs, produce a variety of emergent behaviors. This is a contribution towards the study of social phenomena and transitions governed by the topology of the community.

We consider a model for population dynamics such as for the evolution of bacterial colonies which is of the Fisher type but where the competitive interaction among individuals is nonlocal, and show that spatial structures with interesting features emerge. These features depend on the nature of the competitive interaction as well as on its range, specifically on the presence or absence of tails in, and the central curvature of, the influence function of the interaction.

We analyze the pedestrian evacuation of a rectangular room with a single door considering a lattice gas scheme with the addition of behavioral aspects of the pedestrians. The movement of the individuals is based on random and rational choices and is affected by conflicts between two or more agents that want to advance to the same position. Such conflicts are solved according to certain rules closely related to the concept of strategies in game theory, cooperation and defection. We consider game rules analogous to those from the Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, with payoffs associated to the probabilities of the individuals to advance to the selected site. We find that, even when defecting is the rational choice for any agent, under certain conditions, cooperators can take advantage from mutual cooperation and leave the room more rapidly than defectors.