Autonomous clinical agents increasingly act on Internet-of-Medical-Things (IoMT) end points, yet existing identity and access-management mechanisms remain human-centric, quantum-vulnerable, and poorly suited to continuous action-level trust enforcement. We present PQ-MedTrust, a three-tier post-quantum trust-to-revocation architecture integrating Decentralized Identifiers, Verifiable Credentials, identity–behavior–context trust with risk dependent decay, hybrid classical/post-quantum authentication, and automatic credential revocation. We implement and measure the complete enforcement path and characterize where behavioral trust succeeds, becomes detection-latency limited, or fails to separate malicious from benign behavior. A liboqs-based testbed evaluates classical-only, hybrid, PQC-only, and SLH-DSA configurations. On a general-purpose CPU, classical, hybrid, and PQC-only handshakes remain below 1.5ms, while hybrid authorized actions expand to 21.1KB versus 1.8KB classically. Cryptographic enforcement adds 0.07–11.1ms. Across 1,000 runs per scenario, aggressive scope abuse and one-shot mimicry are detected in 100% of runs, while adaptive stealth reaches 20.2% detection at 24h and 75.3% at 120h. The pooled benign false-positive rate is 1.8% under reliable context, but rises sharply when context is degraded or benign agents emit the unusual-but-in-scope behavior used to characterize adaptive stealth. These results show modest CPU-tier PQC cost but substantial communication overhead, while exposing the operating limits of automatic behavior-driven revocation.
Autonomous clinical agents increasingly act on Internet-of-Medical-Things (IoMT) endpoints, yet existing access-management mechanisms are human-centric, quantum-vulnerable, and poorly suited to continuous action-level enforcement. We present PQ-MedTrust, which couples an identity–behavior–context trust score with risk-dependent decay to post-quantum revocation of agent credentials based on Decentralized Identifiers and Verifiable Credentials, and we characterize where behavioral trust succeeds, becomes detection-latency limited, or fails. In a liboqs testbed on a general-purpose CPU, classical, hybrid, and PQC-only handshakes stay below 1.5 ms, but a hybrid authorized action (handshake, credential, delegation token, and request) occupies 21.1 KB against 1.8 KB classically. The trust-to-revocation path, which signs and pushes a revocation record, takes 0.07 ms with classical and 11.1 ms with SLH-DSA signatures. Over 1000 simulated runs per scenario, policy enforcement revokes every out-of-scope and one-shot mimicry attack (scope is a generator label, not a dose-range check), whereas adaptive stealth is detected in 20.2% of runs at 24 h and 75.3% at 120 h; without the generator’s risk labels, 24 h detection falls to 5.6%. The pooled benign false-positive rate is 1.8% under a reliable context but rises sharply when context degrades or benign agents emit the event class that marks adaptive stealth. A graduated response revokes none of 500 unannounced-emergency runs, although 92.4% reach clinician confirmation, and still revokes every policy violation.