Liangliang Jiang

Dr. Liangliang Jiang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 January 2014 in Journal of Accounting Research
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Journal Article
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JHJoel F. Houston
Joel F. Houston
LJLiangliang Jiang
Liangliang Jiang
CLChen Lin
Chen Lin
YMYue Ma
Yue Ma

1 February 2014 in Journal of Comparative Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LJLiangliang Jiang
Liangliang Jiang
CLChen Lin
Chen Lin
PLPing Lin
Ping Lin
Using a large, unique, firm-level dataset from the Chinese manufacturing sector, we study important factors that are related to emission intensity for three pollutants in China – sulfur dioxide, wastewater, and soot. Our main findings are as follows: (1) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), both foreign-owned firms and domestic public-listed firms exhibit less intensive pollutant emissions; (2) firms in regions with less local protection have lower pollution intensity; (3) better property rights protection is negatively correlated with pollutant discharge over and beyond the national standards; and (4) larger firms, firms in industries that export more, and firms with more educated employees pollute less. These results suggest that China should not target foreign firms more harshly in its effort to reduce industrial pollution. Better institutions in the form of more effective law enforcement and lower entry barriers across regional markets are also means of curbing China’s pressing environmental problems during its current stage of economic development.postprin

14 April 2016 in The Review of Financial Studies
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Journal Article
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LJLiangliang Jiang
Liangliang Jiang
RLRoss Levine
Ross Levine
CLChen Lin
Chen Lin
Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public? By integrating the gravity model of investment with the state-specific process of bank deregulation that occurred in the United States from the 1980s through the 1990s, we develop a bank-specific, time-varying measure of deregulation-induced competition. We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks. Received July 7, 2015; accepted February 4, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.

14 September 2018 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
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Journal Article
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LJLiangliang Jiang
Liangliang Jiang
RLRoss Levine
Ross Levine
CLChen Lin
Chen Lin
We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases the provision of a key banking service: liquidity creation. Although theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on liquidity creation, we find that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation. Consistent with a subset of models emphasizing that banks pushed toward insolvency reduce risk-taking activities, we discover that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation more among banks with less risk-absorbing capacity (e.g., less profitable banks).

22 November 2021 in Accounting Horizons
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Journal Article
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LJLiangliang Jiang
Liangliang Jiang
JPJeffrey A. Pittman
Jeffrey A. Pittman
WSWalid Saffar
Walid Saffar
SYNOPSIS: We study how policy uncertainty influences textual disclosure in the U.S. from 1996 to 2015. Consistent with incentives for voluntary disclosure, we find that policy uncertainty increases textual disclosure quantity, as evident in disclosure length, but lowers textual readability and increases the tone of uncertainty and negativity. We also document that the negative impact on readability subsides when firms are subject to tough external monitoring. Finally, we provide evidence implying that investors perceive such disclosure to be valuable, as evident in cheaper equity financing costs under economic policy uncertainty. JEL Classifications: D72; G14; G18; G34.

1 February 2012 in Journal of Comparative Economics
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Journal Article
Open access
SBSanford V. Berg
Sanford V. Berg
LJLiangliang Jiang
Liangliang Jiang
CLChen Lin
Chen Lin
This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that (1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; (2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; (3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and (4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.postprin