Ying Chen

Mrs. Ying Chen


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 September 2026 in Preprints.org
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ALAnnan Li
Annan Li
WYWang Yuanfang
Wang Yuanfang
ZBZhijiao Bai
Zhijiao Bai
ZQZhenghua Qian
Zhenghua Qian
YCYing Chen
Ying Chen
HWHai Wang
Hai Wang
The increasing connectivity of intelligent vehicles exposes in-vehicle networks to message tampering, replay, impersonation, and unauthorized access. Existing secure communication schemes commonly rely on pre-shared keys or certificate-based public-key infrastructures, which introduce considerable key-distribution and certificate-management overhead when a large number of electronic control units (ECUs) are deployed. To address these issues, this paper proposes a lightweight identity-based secure communication scheme for in-vehicle networks. The proposed scheme separates low-frequency authenticated session establishment from high-frequency data protection. Identity-bound private keys are provisioned offline by a trusted key generation center, and the T-Box and target ECU establish a shared session key through mutual authentication and explicit key confirmation. Direction- and purpose-specific subkeys are subsequently derived to protect bidirectional communication and provide confidentiality, integrity, source authentication, and replay protection. Formal analysis verifies the security properties of the proposed scheme. Experimental results show that the median single-ECU handshake latency is 287.560 ms, while the data-plane processing latency is 1.036 ms per 8-byte message. Under a 500-kbit/s classical-CAN model, the proposed configuration requires 138.75 bits per message and produces a modeled bus load of 49.95% for 18 ECUs. Moreover, all 1200 frame-mutation trials were rejected without unauthorized plaintext release. These results indicate that the proposed scheme provides a practical approach to lightweight and scalable secure communication in in-vehicle networks.

24 October 2026 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ALAnnan Li
Annan Li
WYWang Yuanfang
Wang Yuanfang
ZBZhijiao Bai
Zhijiao Bai
ZQZhenghua Qian
Zhenghua Qian
YCYing Chen
Ying Chen
CHCaizhen He
Caizhen He
The increasing connectivity of intelligent vehicles exposes in-vehicle networks to message tampering, replay, impersonation, and unauthorized access. This paper presents an identity-based secure communication scheme that separates authenticated session establishment from established-session data protection. A trusted Key Generation Center provisions identity-bound private keys offline. The T-Box and a target ECU then perform mutual authentication, derive a shared session root key, and complete explicit bidirectional key confirmation. Direction- and purpose-specific subkeys are used with SM4-CTR and HMAC-SM3 to protect subsequent traffic. In the ProVerif symbolic model, all eleven secrecy and injective-correspondence queries return true under the stated assumptions. On the Windows/Python 3.12.7/UDP prototype, the median single-ECU handshake time is 287.560 ms, and the paired sender-plus-receiver processing median is 1.036 ms per 8-byte message. Under the stated unstuffed 500-kbit/s classical-CAN model, the selected profile requires 138.75 bits per message and yields 49.95% offered load for 18 ECUs at 100 messages/s per ECU. All 1200 frame-mutation trials were rejected without unauthorized plaintext release. These results characterize the symbolic model, host implementation, and analytical traffic model; they do not constitute target-ECU or physical-bus measurements.