This study examines whether pro-climate lobbying intensity is associated with corporate default risk. Using a panel of 4,176 firm-year observations from U.S.-listed firms, we measure financial stability using distance-to-default and pro-climate lobbying intensity as annual pro-climate lobbying expenditure scaled by total assets. Fixed-effects estimates show that pro-climate lobbying intensity is positively and significantly associated with distance-to-default, indicating lower default risk. Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in lobbying intensity corresponds to an approximately 0.084-unit increase in distance-to-default, equivalent to 1.39% of its sample mean. The evidence is consistent with signaling theory, as costly climate-policy engagement may communicate transition preparedness, and stakeholder theory, as alignment with climate-conscious stakeholders may reduce regulatory, reputational, and financing risks. The relationship remains evident after entropy balancing, controlling for lagged distance-to-default in a dynamic specification, and replacing distance-to-default with the Altman Z-score. It is also qualitatively robust to replacing the comprehensive lobbying measure with a narrower text-based proxy that identifies pro-climate lobbying through explicit climate-related keywords. Split-sample analyses show a stronger and more precisely estimated association among firms with at-or-above-median environmental and social performance. Volatility-based splits further indicate that the association is concentrated among firms with at-or-above-median cash-flow and earnings volatility, suggesting that climate-policy engagement may be particularly informative under greater operating uncertainty. These heterogeneous patterns remain descriptive pending formal coefficient-comparison tests. Overall, the study contributes to the corporate political activity, climate-finance, and credit-risk literatures by demonstrating that pro-climate lobbying contains information relevant to financial resilience and that its relevance varies with firms’ sustainability performance and operating uncertainty.
This study examines whether pro-climate lobbying intensity is associated with corporate default risk. Using a panel of 4176 firm-year observations from U.S.-listed firms, we measure financial stability using distance-to-default and pro-climate lobbying intensity as annual pro-climate lobbying expenditure scaled by total assets. Fixed-effects estimates show that pro-climate lobbying intensity is positively and significantly associated with distance-to-default, indicating lower default risk. Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in lobbying intensity corresponds to an approximately 0.084-unit increase in distance-to-default, equivalent to 1.39% of its sample mean. The evidence is consistent with signaling theory, as costly climate engagement may signal transition preparedness, and with stakeholder theory, as alignment with climate-conscious stakeholders may lower regulatory, reputational, and financing risks. The relationship remains evident after entropy balancing, controlling for lagged distance-to-default in a dynamic specification, and replacing distance-to-default with the Altman Z-score. It is also qualitatively robust to replace the comprehensive lobbying measure with a narrower text-based proxy that identifies pro-climate lobbying through explicit climate-related keywords. Split-sample analyses show a stronger association among firms with at-or-above-median environmental and social performance and among firms with at-or-above-median cash-flow and earnings volatility, suggesting that climate-policy engagement is most informative under greater operating uncertainty; these patterns remain descriptive pending formal coefficient-comparison tests. Overall, the study contributes to the corporate political activity, climate-finance, and credit-risk bodies of literature by showing that pro-climate lobbying carries information relevant to financial resilience and that its relevance varies with firms’ sustainability performance and operating uncertainty.
This study examines whether firm-level climate risk exposure is associated with accounting transparency using a global panel of firm-year observations spanning 91 countries. Corporate climate risk exposure is measured using earnings-call text-based indicators developed by Sautner et al. (2023), while accounting transparency is captured through three proxies: absolute accruals, earnings smoothing ratio, and earnings smoothing correlation. The results show that climate risk exposure is negatively and significantly associated with absolute accruals, indicating that climate-exposed firms exhibit lower accrual-based opacity and therefore higher accrual-based accounting transparency. The effect is economically meaningful: a one-standard-deviation increase in climate risk exposure is associated with a 13.2% decline in absolute accruals relative to the sample mean. This finding is robust to entropy balancing, dynamic system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, and an alternative climate exposure proxy. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) channel analyses further show that the negative association between climate risk exposure and absolute accruals is stronger among firms with above-median social, environmental, and governance scores, suggesting that ESG performance strengthens the transparency response to climate-related uncertainty. By contrast, climate risk exposure is not significantly associated with earnings smoothing ratio or earnings smoothing correlation across ESG groups, indicating that the effect is concentrated in the accrual-based channel rather than in smoothing-based reporting behaviour. The study contributes to the climate-finance literature and the accounting literature by linking firm-level climate risk exposure to financial reporting quality and by identifying ESG performance as an important conditioning mechanism. The findings are consistent with information asymmetry and signalling perspectives and carry practical implications for regulators, standard-setters, auditors, boards, and investors.