Alexey S. Petrenko

Dr. Alexey S. Petrenko


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 August 2025 in Sci
Verified
Journal Article
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Evgeniya IshchukovaEvgeniya Ishchukova
Evgeniya Ishchukova
Sergei PetrenkoSergei Petrenko
Sergei Petrenko
APAlexey S. Petrenko
Alexey S. Petrenko
Konstantin GnidkoKonstantin Gnidko
Konstantin Gnidko
Alexey NekrasovAlexey Nekrasov
Alexey Nekrasov
Today, blockchain technologies are a separate, rapidly developing area. With rapid development, they open up a number of scientific problems. One of these problems is the problem of reliability, which is primarily associated with the use of cryptographic primitives. The threat of the emergence of quantum computers is now widely discussed, in connection with which the direction of post-quantum cryptography is actively developing. Nevertheless, the most popular blockchain platforms (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum) use asymmetric cryptography based on elliptic curves. Here, cryptographic primitives for blockchain systems are divided into four groups according to their functionality: keyless, single-key, dual-key, and hybrid. The main attention in the work is paid to the most significant cryptographic primitives for blockchain systems: keyless and single-key. This manuscript discusses possible scenarios in which, during practical implementation, the mathematical foundations embedded in the algorithms for generating a digital signature and encrypting data using algorithms based on elliptic curves are violated. In this case, vulnerabilities arise that can lead to the compromise of a private key or a substitution of a digital signature. We consider cases of vulnerabilities in a blockchain system due to incorrect use of a cryptographic primitive, describe the problem, formulate the problem statement, and assess its complexity for each case. For each case, strict calculations of the maximum computational costs are given when the conditions of the case under consideration are met. Among other things, we present a new version of the encryption algorithm for data stored in blockchain systems or transmitted between blockchain systems using elliptic curves. This algorithm is not the main blockchain algorithm and is not included in the core of modern blockchain systems. This algorithm allows the use of the same keys that system users have in order to store sensitive user data in an open blockchain database in encrypted form. At the same time, possible vulnerabilities that may arise from incorrect implementation of this algorithm are considered. The scenarios formulated in the article can be used to test the reliability of both newly created blockchain platforms and to study long-existing ones.

17 June 2026 in Technologies
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Journal Article
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Evgeniya IshchukovaEvgeniya Ishchukova
Evgeniya Ishchukova
FSFaezeh Sadat Sajadi
Faezeh Sadat Sajadi
Sergei PetrenkoSergei Petrenko
Sergei Petrenko
APAlexey S. Petrenko
Alexey S. Petrenko
Alexey NekrasovAlexey Nekrasov
Alexey Nekrasov
We performed a cross-layer, system-level analysis of the post-quantum transition of blockchain architectures through a systematic review. The analysis, based on 108 peer-reviewed studies, moves beyond post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as merely a primitive substitution and examines how quantum pressures cascade through validation, propagation, interoperability, governance, and regulatory layers. Empirical results show that the authenticated payloads for lattice signatures grow from ~65–73 bytes (ECDSA) up to kilobyte-scale sizes, and verification overhead is increased by a factor of 2× to 5× depending on the deployment scenario. Such inflation can narrow block-capacity margins, increase propagation delay under fixed-interval regimes, and shift validator resource thresholds in heterogeneous networks. Moreover, the harvest-now–decrypt-later model creates a temporal asymmetry between the design options and the exposure window. These findings indicate that post-quantum resilience depends more on maintaining a structural balance among the tightly coupled technical and institutional stress channels than on the strength of the algorithm itself, and migration success ultimately depends on the ability to coordinate the management of these constraints, rather than on managing them separately.

9 July 2026 in Sci
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Journal Article
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Evgeniya IshchukovaEvgeniya Ishchukova
Evgeniya Ishchukova
KRKirill Сергеевич Romanenko
Kirill Сергеевич Romanenko
Sergei PetrenkoSergei Petrenko
Sergei Petrenko
APAlexey S. Petrenko
Alexey S. Petrenko
Alexey NekrasovAlexey Nekrasov
Alexey Nekrasov
With the development of quantum computing, classical cryptosystems (RSA, ECDSA) that ensure the security of distributed ledgers face an existential threat. This paper examines protocols for protecting personal data (PD) in blockchain, taking into account the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” strategy. We propose and formalize a family of protocols designed for storing and exchanging personal data in blockchain systems. The article describes in detail approaches to software implementations of smart contracts for the Ethereum (using ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme) and Keccak-256) and Hyperledger Fabric 2.5 (integrating NIST post-quantum standards: ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism) and ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm)) platforms based on the developed protocols. For all developed protocols, a Threat Agent Model (TAM) is presented, threat scenarios are examined, and resilience to typical attack scenarios is demonstrated. A comparative analysis of computational efficiency and overhead is conducted. The results show that using lattice cryptography provides high performance, but the 50-fold increase in signature size makes direct implementation of PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) in Layer 1 public networks economically unfeasible. A hybrid model and the use of Layer 2 to ensure quantum resistance are proposed.

2 August 2026 in Computers
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Journal Article
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Evgeniya IshchukovaEvgeniya Ishchukova
Evgeniya Ishchukova
FSFaezeh Sadat Sajadi
Faezeh Sadat Sajadi
Sergei PetrenkoSergei Petrenko
Sergei Petrenko
APAlexey S. Petrenko
Alexey S. Petrenko
Alexey NekrasovAlexey Nekrasov
Alexey Nekrasov
The harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) attack is an attack that collects encrypted information now and decrypts it later after the arrival of a quantum computer that can perform some cryptographic operations. Time of exposure is data retention and not Q-Day, so the threat is imminent, but it is not reflected in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). We present the Quantum Risk Index (QRI), which is based on CVSS base severity, the Quantum Factor (QF, vulnerability to Shor’s or Grover’s algorithm), and the HNDL Score (HS, susceptibility to a harvest-and-store adversary). We computed the QRI for 78,587 CVEs that were cataloged in the NIST National Vulnerability Database between January 2016 and the first quarter of 2026 and cross-checked it with the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) list. The number of CVEs related to cryptography increased by a CAGR of 11.0%, while the number of Shor-vulnerable CVEs increased at a CAGR of 8.8%. The 437 KEV-matched CVEs carry a mean QRI of 13.05, against 10.31 for the non-KEV remainder—a 26.6% separation (p = 2.17 × 10−63)—and Shor-vulnerable CVEs appear in the KEV list at 1.52 times the baseline rate (p = 0.002). This separation is valid for each of the tested settings of QF and HS. This is the first study to apply a quantum-adjusted vulnerability score to a government’s in-the-wild vulnerability reporting database at the CVE scale, providing a repeatable foundation for quantum-aware vulnerability triage.

27 April 2026 in Sci
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Journal Article
Open access
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Evgeniya IshchukovaEvgeniya Ishchukova
Evgeniya Ishchukova
Sergei PetrenkoSergei Petrenko
Sergei Petrenko
APAlexey S. Petrenko
Alexey S. Petrenko
ABArtyom A. Balyabin
Artyom A. Balyabin
Alexey NekrasovAlexey Nekrasov
Alexey Nekrasov
This article proposes a mathematical model for quantitatively assessing the cyber resilience of modern blockchain platforms. Constructing the mathematical model, the authors proposed representing the architecture of a blockchain-based information system as four layers: the cryptographic algorithm layer, the blockchain core layer, the smart contract layer, and the decentralized application layer. A study of typical vulnerabilities was conducted for each layer, and a list of countermeasures to counter potential threats was proposed. Then, key elements and their impact on the system’s cyber resilience were identified. As a result, a mathematical model for assessing the cyber resilience of blockchain platforms was developed. Based on the analysis of the model, it was experimentally demonstrated that a cyber attack carried out at a lower layer affects all higher layers of the blockchain platform, and cyber resilience at the current layer can only be effectively ensured if it is ensured at the previous layer.

3 November 2026 in Sci
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Evgeniya IshchukovaEvgeniya Ishchukova
Evgeniya Ishchukova
FSFaezeh Sadat Sajadi
Faezeh Sadat Sajadi
Sergei PetrenkoSergei Petrenko
Sergei Petrenko
APAlexey S. Petrenko
Alexey S. Petrenko
Alexey NekrasovAlexey Nekrasov
Alexey Nekrasov
Distributed ledgers must migrate from elliptic-curve signatures to post-quantum alternatives, and the open question is no longer which primitives are available but which ledger resource they exhaust first. This paper identifies the binding constraint of a block-constrained ledger after migration and its margin: whether capacity is limited by transaction payload or by signature-verification throughput. The inputs are measurements of the three NIST-selected families—ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), and FN-DSA (FIPS 206, in development)—across all nine parameter sets and three classical baselines on one x86-64 platform under WSL2. Under first-order analytical bounds, payload capacity is the binding constraint for every scheme at the block sizes, intervals, and transaction formats examined, with verification headroom from 124 to 1622 times for the post-quantum configurations. The verification advantage of ML-DSA is parameter-dependent: ML-DSA-44 verifies 1.47 times faster than the ECDSA secp256k1 ledger verifier, whereas ML-DSA-87, mandated by CNSA 2.0, is 1.67 times slower; absolute timings and these ratios may differ on other platforms. Five of the nine configurations are Pareto-optimal within their security level. The FN-DSA results reflect the liboqs 0.16.0 implementation and may change once FIPS 206 is finalized. An interleaved control-probe protocol holds the mean cross-run coefficient of variation to 1.35%.