To promote the reformation of the electricity market in China, a market mechanism that can support collaboration between the contract market and the upcoming spot market was designed in this paper. The focus of this paper was to develop a mechanism to institutionally stabilize the market by way of disciplining market power abuse through limiting arbitrage opportunities generated from multi-markets. To quantitatively describe the arbitrage opportunity, the arbitrage opportunity function (AOF) was defined. Based on inferences of the no-arbitrage principle and the AOF, a cost-based decomposition algorithm for contracts that could improve contract coverage was proposed. The incentive compatible settlement rule for the uncovered generation on the spot market was designed to properly manipulate the arbitrage opportunity. The decomposition algorithm and the settlement rule constituted the designed market mechanism. To verify the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism, the principles of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and payment cost minimization were employed to test the designed market mechanism based on the concept of dominant policy equilibrium. This test was conducted on a fictitious case based on the IEEE-14 system. The analysis and results may provide valuable insights on market design in China based on the functional correlation between the contract market and the spot market.
The phenomenon of crossing the forbidden zone is unavoidable and wasteful when scheduling the hydro units. In this paper, the effect of crossing the forbidden zone is taken into account using the strategic offering model to help the price-maker hydro producers (PMHPs) devise more economic offering strategies in this paper. This effect is economically quantified and formulated in the form of the mixed integer linear program (MILP) with the use of the big M method and the piecewise linear technique. Therefore, the effect of crossing the forbidden zone therefore can easily be incorporated into the strategic offering model. Based on the residual demand curve (RDC) scenarios, the strategic offering model, which consists of offering and self-scheduling models, is established according to the real-world data from the Three Gorges Project (TGP). The whole optimization model is then converted into the form of MILP formulations by properly discretizing the net head. A test case based on the TGP is presented, in which the strategic offering model is set as a comparable test while ignoring the effect of crossing the forbidden zone. The results provide insight on the offering strategy and physical system operations during a single day. The outcomes indicate that the model that incorporates the effect of crossing the forbidden zone will effectively prevent the crossing phenomenon from happening and that the proposed strategic offering model is more useful for assisting a PMHP in developing profitable offering strategy.
1 February 2022 in International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems
This paper integrates Knowledge Graph, Scale-free Network, and Bayesian Network for fault diagnosis of the power grid. The proposed model combines Knowledge Graph based on typical accident reports with the Scale-free Network model to establish and simplify the causal network for better representing accident scenarios in the power grid. Subsequently, it constructs a Bayesian Network for quantitative analysis of accidents, from causes to consequences. Then, sensitivity analysis is conducted to provide valuable support for decision-making in power grid safety management. Based on the results of sensitivity analysis, the critical causation path of “Circuit Breaker Trip” is “Animal Intrusion”→“Improper Safety Distance”→“Two-phase Short Circuit”→“Switch Trip”→“Circuit Breaker Trip”.