In extensive studies with two split-brain patients we replicate the standard finding that stimuli cannot be compared across visual half-fields, indicating that each hemisphere processes information independently of the other. Yet, crucially, we show that the canonical textbook findings that a split-brain patient can only respond to stimuli in the left visual half-field with the left hand, and to stimuli in the right visual half-field with the right hand and verbally, are not universally true. Across a wide variety of tasks, split-brain patients with a complete and radiologically confirmed transection of the corpus callosum showed full awareness of presence, and well above chance-level recognition of location, orientation and identity of stimuli throughout the entire visual field, irrespective of response type (left hand, right hand, or verbally). Crucially, we used confidence ratings to assess conscious awareness. This revealed that also on high confidence trials, indicative of conscious perception, response type did not affect performance. These findings suggest that severing the cortical connections between hemispheres splits visual perception, but does not create two independent conscious perceivers within one brain.

Although tracking identical moving objects has been studied since the 1980's, only recently the study into tracking moving objects with distinct identities has started (referred to as Multiple Identity Tracking, MIT). So far, only behavioral studies into MIT have been undertaken. These studies have left a fundamental question regarding MIT unanswered, is MIT a one-stage or a two-stage process? According to the one-stage model, after a location has been attended, the identity is released without effort. However, according to the two-stage model, there are two effortful stages in MIT, attending to a location, and attending to the identity of the object at that location. In the current study we investigated this question by measuring brain activity in response to tracking familiar and unfamiliar targets. Familiarity is known to automate effortful processes, so if attention to identify the object is needed, this should become easier. However, if no such attention is needed, familiarity can only affect other processes (such as memory for the target set). Our results revealed that on unfamiliar trials neural activity was higher in both attentional networks, and visual identification networks. These results suggest that familiarity in MIT automates attentional identification processes, thus suggesting that attentional identification is needed in MIT. This then would imply that MIT is essentially a two-stage process, since after attending the location, the identity does not seem to come for free.

Visual deficits are common after stroke and are powerful predictors for the chronic functional outcome. However, while basic visual field and recognition deficits are relatively easy to assess with standardized methods, selective deficits in visual primitives, such as shape or motion, are harder to identify, as they often require a symmetrical bilateral posterior lesion in order to provoke full field deficits. Therefore, we do not know how often they occur. Nevertheless, they can have severe repercussions for daily-life functioning. We aimed to investigate the prevalence and co-occurrence of hemifield “mid-range” visual deficits (i.e. color, shape, location, orientation, correlated motion, contrast, texture and glossiness), using a novel experimental set-up with a gaze-contingent presentation of the stimuli. To this end, a prospective cohort of 220 ischemic (sub)cortical stroke patients and a healthy control group was assessed with this set-up. When comparing performance of patients with controls, the results showed that deficits in motion-perception were most prevalent (26%), followed by color (22%), texture (22%), location (21%), orientation (18%), contrast (14%), shape (14%) and glossiness (13%). 63% of the stroke patients showed one or more mid-range visual deficits. Overlap of deficits was small; they mostly occurred in isolation or co-occurred with only one or two other deficits. To conclude, it was found that deficits in “mid-range” visual functions were very prevalent. These deficits are likely to affect the chronic post-stroke condition. Since we found no strong patterns of co-occurrences, we suggest that an assessment of deficits at this level of visual processing requires screening the full range of visual functions.

In their paper Doerig et al. argue that we should put the hard problem aside and focus on empirical data to solve the ‘easy’ problems of consciousness – finding the neural and functional correlates of consciousness. In other words ‘shut up and measure’. This has worked well with other thorny issues, such as explaining life, so why not adopt this approach here? We argue that despite the popularity of this view it is not feasible. In order to collect any consciousness data one needs to take an implicit or explicit stance on the hard problem.