Fleming-Viot processes are probability-measure-valued diffusion processes that can be used as stochastic models in population genetics. Here we use duality methods to prove ergodic theorems for Fleming-Viot processes, including those with recombination. Coupling methods are also used to establish ergodicity of Fleming-Viot processes, first without and then with selection. A special type of selection known as symmetric overdominance is treated by other methods.
Assuming that cards are dealt with replacement from a single deck and that each of Player and Banker sees the total of his own two-card hand but not its composition, baccara is a 2 x 288 matrix game, which was solved by Kemeny and Snell in 1957. Assuming that cards are dealt without replacement from a d-deck shoe and that Banker sees the composition of his own two-card hand while Player sees only his own total, baccara is a 2 x 2484 matrix game, which was solved by Downton and Lockwood in 1975 for d = 1, 2, . . . , 8. Assuming that cards are dealt without replacement from a d-deck shoe and that each of Player and Banker sees the composition of his own two-card hand, baccara is a 25 x 2484 matrix game, which is solved herein for every positive integer d.
13 August 2020 in UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal
Snackjack is a highly simplified version of blackjack that was proposed by Ethier (2010) and given its name by Epstein (2013). The eight-card deck comprises two aces, two deuces, and four treys, with aces having value either 1 or 4, and deuces and treys having values 2 and 3, respectively. The target total is 7 (vs. 21 in blackjack), and ace-trey is a natural. The dealer stands on 6 and 7, including soft totals, and otherwise hits. The player can stand, hit, double, or split, but split pairs receive only one card per paircard (like split aces in blackjack), and there is no insurance. We analyze the game, both single and multiple deck, deriving basic strategy and one-parameter card-counting systems. Unlike in blackjack, these derivations can be done by hand, though it may nevertheless be easier and more reliable to use a computer. More importantly, the simplicity of snackjack allows us to do computations that would be prohibitively time-consuming at blackjack. We can thereby enhance our understanding of blackjack by thoroughly exploring snackjack.
There are 134,459 distinct initial hands at the video poker game Jacks or Better, taking suit exchangeability into account. A computer program can determine the optimal strategy (i.e., which cards to hold) for each such hand, but a complete list of these strategies would require a book-length manuscript. Instead, a hand-rank table, which fits on a single page and reproduces the optimal strategy perfectly, was found for Jacks or Better as early as the mid 1990s. Is there a systematic way to derive such a hand-rank table? We show that there is indeed, and it involves finding the exact optimal conditional expected return, given the initial hand. In the case of Jacks or Better (paying 800, 50, 25, 9, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0), this is a random variable with 1,153 distinct values, of which 766 correspond to garbage hands for which it is optimal to draw five new cards. We describe the hands corresponding to each of the remaining 387 values of the optimal conditional expected return (sorted from largest to smallest) and show how this leads readily to an optimal strategy hand-rank table for Jacks or Better. Of course, the method applies to other video poker games as well.
Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. However, this solution exists only for certain \(\theta\). A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exists. Under a ''with replacement'' assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all \(\theta\).