African Swine Fever (ASF) is an important contagious haemorrhagic viral disease affecting swine whose notification is mandatory due to its high mortality rates and the great sanitary and socioeconomic impact it has on international trade in animal and swine products. This disease only affects porcine species, both wild and domestic, and produces a variety of clinical signs such as fever and functional disorders of the digestive and respiratory systems. Lesions are mainly characterized by congestive-haemorrhagic alterations. ASF epidemiology varies significantly between countries, regions and continents, since it depends on the characteristics of the virus in circulation, the presence of wild hosts and reservoirs, environmental conditions and human social behaviour. Furthermore, a specific host will not necessarily always play the same active role in the spread and maintenance of ASF in a particular area. Currently, ASF is endemic in most sub-Saharan African countries where wild hosts and tick vectors (Ornithodoros) play an important role acting as biological reservoirs for the virus. In Europe, the disease has been endemic since 1978 on the island of Sardinia (Italy) and since 2007, when it was first reported in Georgia, in a number of Eastern European countries. It is also endemic in certain regions of the Russia Federation, where domestic pig and wild boar populations are widely affected. By contrast, in the affected eastern European Union (EU) countries where ASF is currently as epidemic, the on-going spread of the disease affects mainly wild boar populations located in restricted areas and, to a much less extent, domestic pigs. Unlike most livestock diseases, no vaccine or specific treatment is currently available for ASF. Therefore, disease control is mainly based on early detection and the application of strict sanitary and biosecurity measures. Epidemiology of ASF is very complex by the existence of different virus circulating, reservoirs and a number of scenarios, and the on-going spread of the disease through Africa and Europe. Survivor pigs can remain persistently infected for months which may contribute to virus transmission and thus the spread and maintenance of the disease, thereby complicating attempts to control it.

African swine fever (ASF) is a complex disease of swine, caused by a large DNA virus belonging to the family Asfarviridae. The disease shows variable clinical signs, with high case fatality rates, up to 100%, in the acute forms. ASF is currently present in Africa and Europe where it circulates in different scenarios causing a high socio-economic impact. In most affected regions, control has not been effective in part due to lack of a vaccine. The availability of an effective and safe ASFV vaccines would support and enforce control–eradication strategies. Therefore, work leading to the rational development of protective ASF vaccines is a high priority. Several factors have hindered vaccine development, including the complexity of the ASF virus particle and the large number of proteins encoded by its genome. Many of these virus proteins inhibit the host’s immune system thus facilitating virus replication and persistence. We review previous work aimed at understanding ASFV–host interactions, including mechanisms of protective immunity, and approaches for vaccine development. These include live attenuated vaccines, and “subunit” vaccines, based on DNA, proteins, or virus vectors. In the shorter to medium term, live attenuated vaccines are the most promising and best positioned candidates. Gaps and future research directions are evaluated.

Transboundary animal diseases can have very severe socio-economic impacts when introduced into new regions. The history of disease incursions into the European Union suggests that initial outbreaks were often initiated by illegal importation of meat and derived products. The European Union would benefit from decision-support tools to evaluate the risk of disease introduction caused by illegal imports in order to inform its surveillance strategy. However, due to the difficulty in quantifying illegal movements of animal products, very few studies of this type have been conducted. Using African swine fever as an example, this work presents a novel risk assessment framework for disease introduction into the European Union through illegal importation of meat and products. It uses a semi-quantitative approach based on factors that likely influence the likelihood of release of contaminated smuggled meat and products, and subsequent exposure of the susceptible population. The results suggest that the European Union is at non-negligible risk of African swine fever introduction through illegal importation of pork and products. On a relative risk scale with six categories from negligible to very high, five European Union countries were estimated at high (France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom) or moderate (Spain) risk of African swine fever release, five countries were at high risk of exposure if African swine fever were released (France, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain) and ten countries had a moderate exposure risk (Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom). The approach presented here and results obtained for African swine fever provide a basis for the enhancement of risk-based surveillance systems and disease prevention programmes in the European Union.

The presence of African swine fever (ASF) in the Caucasus region and Russian Federation has increased concerns that wild boars may introduce the ASF virus into the European Union (EU). This study describes a semi‐quantitative approach for evaluating the risk of ASF introduction into the EU by wild boar movements based on the following risk estimators: the susceptible population of (1) wild boars and (2) domestic pigs in the country of origin; the outbreak density in (3) wild boars and (4) domestic pigs in the countries of origin, the (5) suitable habitat for wild boars along the EU border; and the distance between the EU border and the nearest ASF outbreak in (6) wild boars or (7) domestic pigs. Sensitivity analysis was performed to identify the most influential risk estimators. The highest risk was found to be concentrated in Finland, Romania, Latvia and Poland, and wild boar habitat and outbreak density were the two most important risk estimators. Animal health authorities in at‐risk countries should be aware of these risk estimators and should communicate closely with wild boar hunters and pig farmers to rapidly detect and control ASF.

During the past decade, African swine fever (ASF) has spread from the Caucasus region to eastern European Union countries affecting domestic pig and wild boar populations. In order to avert ASF spread, mitigation measures targeting both populations have been established. However, despite these efforts, ASF has been reported in thirteen different countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, Czech Republic, and Romania). In the absence of an effective vaccine or treatment to ASF, introduction and spread of ASF onto domestic pig farms can only be prevented by strict compliance to control measures. This study systematically reviewed available measures to prevent the spread of ASF in the EU domestic pig sector distinguishing between commercial, non-commercial, and outdoor farms. The search was performed in PubMed and using a common browser. A total of 52 documents were selected for the final review process, which included scientific articles, reports, EU documents and official recommendations, among others. From this literature review, 37 measures were identified as preventive measures for the introduction and spread of ASF. Subsequently, these measures were assessed by ASF experts for their relevance in the mitigation of ASF spread on the three mentioned types of farms. All experts agreed that some of the important preventive measures for all three types of farms were: the identification of animals and farm records; strict enforcement of the ban on swill feeding; and containment of pigs, so as to not allow direct or indirect pig–pig and/or pig–wild boar contacts. Other important preventive measures for all farms were education of farmers, workers, and operators; no contact between farmers and farm staff and external pigs; appropriate removal of carcasses, slaughter residues, and food waste; proper disposal of manure and dead animals, and abstaining from hunting activities during the previous 48 h (allowing a 48 h interval between hunting and being in contact with domestic pigs). Finally, all experts identified that the important preventive measures for non-commercial and outdoor farms is to improve access of those farms to veterinarians and health services.