El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer formas alternativas de medición de las tasas de delincuencia en los entornos urbanos, comparando la utilización de la presencia de población y la medición tradicional, es decir, la población residencial. El análisis se realiza para tres tipos de delitos: violencia intrafamiliar, robo a persona y robo a negocio. Para ello, se sigue una metodología de análisis espacial de los datos de la Zona Metropolitana de Guadalajara (ZMG) en México. En los resultados se comprueba que, para algunos tipos de delitos, la presencia de población puede identificar con mayor precisión a la población en riesgo, lo que puede constituir una herramienta de política pública muy útil de cara a la prevención del delito, pues además de lograr una estimación más precisa del fenómeno, se pueden identificar las zonas generadoras y atractoras del crimen.

This paper asks which type of political behaviour drives spatial interdependence in municipal spending. Under yardstick competition, voters benchmark their incumbent against neighbouring jurisdictions, but the literature offers two opposite predictions about who mimics most: the swing voter hypothesis predicts that electorally vulnerable incumbents mimic more, while the core voter hypothesis predicts that politically strong incumbents mimic more. I extend the yardstick competition model to allow the spatial autoregressive parameter to vary across regimes defined by two dimensions of political strength, horizontal electoral concentration and vertical alignment with the federal president and the state governor, and take the predictions to a panel of 857-940 Mexican municipalities over 2001-2021 using regime-switching spatial Durbin models estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood with time-varying Jacobians. When political strength is measured by electoral concentration, politically weak mayors mimic around 60 percent more than strong ones, supporting the swing voter hypothesis. When it is measured by vertical alignment, aligned mayors mimic significantly more, supporting the core voter hypothesis. Four-regime specifications reveal an asymmetry: national alignment combined with concentration reinforces the core voter pattern, regional alignment combined with concentration reverses the concentration effect, and the joint combination of both vertical alignments restores the swing voter pattern. The two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive but operate along different dimensions of political strength.