Ines Jentzsch

Prof. Dr. Ines Jentzsch


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2002 in Cognitive Brain Research
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Journal Article
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SSStefan Robert Schweinberger
Stefan Robert Schweinberger
EPEsther C Pickering
Esther C Pickering
IJInes Jentzsch
Ines Jentzsch
ABA.MIke Burton
A.MIke Burton
JKJürgen M Kaufmann
Jürgen M Kaufmann

1 February 2009 in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
IJInes Jentzsch
Ines Jentzsch
CDCarolin Dudschig
Carolin Dudschig
People often become slower in their performance after committing an error, which is usually explained by strategic control adjustments towards a more conservative response threshold. The present study tested an alternative hypothesis for explaining posterror slowing in terms of behavioural interferences resulting from error monitoring by manipulating stimulus contrast and categorization difficulty in a choice reaction time task. The response–stimulus interval (RSI) was either short or long, using a between-subject (Experiment 1) and a within-subject design (Experiment 2). Posterror slowing was larger and posterror accuracy lower in short than in long RSI situations. Effects of stimulus contrast disappeared in posterror trials when RSI was short. At long RSIs, stimulus contrast was additive with posterror slowing. The results support the idea that at least two mechanisms contribute to posterror slowing: a capacity-limited error-monitoring process with the strongest influence at short RSIs and a criterion adjustment mechanism at longer RSIs.

1 January 2006 in Neuropsychologia
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Journal Article
Closed access
RSReiner Sprengelmeyer
Reiner Sprengelmeyer
IJInes Jentzsch
Ines Jentzsch

28 April 2016 in Brain
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
STSerenella Tolomeo
Serenella Tolomeo
DCDavid Christmas
David Christmas
IJInes Jentzsch
Ines Jentzsch
BJBlair Johnston
Blair Johnston
RSReiner Sprengelmeyer
Reiner Sprengelmeyer
DSDouglas Steele
Douglas Steele
Converging evidence has linked the anterior mid-cingulate cortex to negative affect, pain and cognitive control. It has previously been proposed that this region uses information about punishment to control aversively motivated actions. Studies on the effects of lesions allow causal inferences about brain function; however, naturally occurring lesions in the anterior mid-cingulate cortex are rare. In two studies we therefore recruited 94 volunteers, comprising 15 patients with treatment-resistant depression who had received bilateral anterior cingulotomy, which consists of lesions made within the anterior mid-cingulate cortex, 20 patients with treatment-resistant depression who had not received surgery and 59 healthy control subjects. Using the Ekman 60 faces paradigm and two Stroop paradigms, we tested the hypothesis that patients who received anterior cingulotomy were impaired in recognizing negative facial affect expressions but not positive or neutral facial expressions, and impaired in Stroop cognitive control, with larger lesions being associated with more impairment. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that larger volume lesions predicted more impairment in recognizing fear, disgust and anger, and no impairment in recognizing facial expressions of surprise or happiness. However, we found no impairment in recognizing expressions of sadness. Also consistent with the hypothesis, we found that larger volume lesions predicted impaired Stroop cognitive control. Notably, this relationship was only present when anterior mid-cingulate cortex lesion volume was defined as the overlap between cingulotomy lesion volume and Shackman’s meta-analysis-derived binary masks for negative affect and cognitive control. Given substantial evidence from healthy subjects that the anterior mid-cingulate cortex is part of a network associated with the experience of negative affect and pain, engaging cognitive control processes for optimizing behaviour in the presence of such stimuli, our findings support the assertion that this region has a causal role in these processes. While the clinical justification for cingulotomy is empirical and not theoretical, it is plausible that lesions within a brain region associated with the subjective experience of negative affect and pain may be therapeutic for patients with otherwise intractable mood, anxiety and pain syndromes.

1 May 2015 in Cognition
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Journal Article
Open access
EBElisabeth E.F. Bradford
Elisabeth E.F. Bradford
IJInes Jentzsch
Ines Jentzsch
JGJuan-Carlos Gomez
Juan-Carlos Gomez
'Theory of Mind' refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This study examined the extent to which 'Self' and 'Other' belief-attribution processes within the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism could be distinguished behaviourally, and whether these separable components differentially related to Executive Functioning (EF) abilities. A computerized false-belief task, utilizing a matched-design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented vs. other-oriented belief-attribution, was used to assess ToM, and a face-image Stroop task was employed to assess EF, within a population of typically-developed adults. Results revealed significantly longer reaction times when attributing beliefs to other people as opposed to recognizing and attributing beliefs to oneself. Intriguingly, results revealed that 'perspective-shift' requirements (i.e. changing from adoption of the 'self' perspective to the perspective of the 'other', or vice versa) across false-belief trials influenced reaction times. Reaction times were significantly longer when the perspective shift was from self-to-other than from other-to-self. It is suggested that the 'self' forms the stem of understanding the 'other', and is therefore processed regardless of ultimate task demands; in contrast, the 'other' perspective is only processed when explicitly required. We conclude that adopting another person's perspective, even when their belief state is matched to one's own, requires more cognitive effort than recalling and reflecting on self-oriented belief-states.

1 October 2009 in Brain Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CDCarolin Dudschig
Carolin Dudschig
IJInes Jentzsch
Ines Jentzsch