Recent cyberattacks on critical infrastructure systems coupled with the technology-induced complexity of the system of systems have necessitated a review of existing methods of assessing critical systems security risk exposure. The question is; do existing security risk assessment methods adequately address the threats of modern critical infrastructure systems? Having examined six existing assessment frameworks, we argue, the complexities associated with modern critical infrastructure systems make existing methods insufficient to assess systems security risks exposure. From systems dynamics perspectives, this paper proposes a dynamic modelling approach as an alternative.
27 April 2020 in Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility
The paper assesses how stock market volatility reacts to data breach disclosure. The paper applies Volatility Event Analysis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test to analyse how equity risk (stock volatility) of 96 firms listed on the S&P 500 index reacted to the announcement of a data breach using records from Breach Level Index (BLI ) over the period between January 2013 and December 2018. Two levels of empirical analysis were performed: cross-section level and industry level. We employ statistical tests that adjust for the effects of cross-section firm-specific mean and volatility. The analysis delivers the following results: Firstly, cross-sectional analysis shows that there is evidence of significant abnormal across the firms and significant difference between before and after cyberattacks announcements. Secondly, the industry level analysis reveals that the firms in the financial industry exhibit more abnormal volatility and returns than firms in other sectors. Additionally, there is significant evidence of the difference in pre and post cyberattacks or data breach announcements, however, this effect tends to be more pronounced after the announcement of a data breach. Implying that data breach announcements can significantly influence equity volatility. In conclusion, the paper posits, equity investors and other stakeholders should reconsider their approach to cybersecurity events when updating the risk measures of their stocks and portfolios.
Despite the advances in two-factor and biometric authentication techniques, systems de signers, application developers, and organizations continue to rely on passwords despite the phishing resistance of origin-bound public-key credentials. This study examines whether ap plication/systems designers should eliminate passwords or retain them within layered security architectures. Using qualitative analysis, the study examined an asynchronous discussion involving 28 middle- and senior-level IT managers, yielding 40 unique contributions and 16 original positional statements. These positions were compared with 36 scholarly studies published between 2021 and 2026 and relevant standards and guidance from NIST, the Software Engineering Institute, ISO/IEC, the PCI Security Standards Council, CISA, and European regulators. None of the 16 statements supported immediate password elimination, while 13 endorsed a phased transition prioritizing phishing-resistant authentication and retaining passwords as time-limited fallbacks for legacy systems, recovery, and exceptions. Recovery, regulatory compliance, legacy compatibility, and implementation costs dominated practitioners’ concerns, although cost allocation remained unresolved. Findings indicate that residual risks concentrate in recovery mechanisms, weaker secondary factors, and continuity failures rather than credential cryptography. The study introduces a recovery-assurance rule requiring recovery mechanisms to meet or exceed sign-in assurance and distinguishes peer-level password options from expiring exceptions. It proposes the Risk-Tiered Passwordless Transition Framework (RT-PTF), aligning four risk tiers with NIST SP 800-63-4 assurance levels and deriving six testable propositions.
The prospect that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) could eventually compromise RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) and elliptic-curve cryptography presents organizations with a complex investment decision under substantial technological and economic uncertainty. This paper examines organizational responses to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) investment through qualitative thematic analysis of a purposive corpus of practitioner and executive position statements, triangulated with peer-reviewed research and technical and governance literature on PQC migration, cryptographic agility, and the harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat. Findings reveal broad convergence toward a phased preparation strategy centered on cryptographic agility, rather than immediate large scale replacement or passive deferral. The analysis indicates that data confidentiality lifespan is a more actionable risk variable than the uncertain timing of CRQC availability, while financial, operational, and interoperability constraints limit the practicality of wholesale migration. The paper contributes a stakeholder aware decision framework and practical phased actions, including cryptographic inventory, data classification by confidentiality lifetime, hybrid deployment, vendor accountability, and agile security architectures, to support organizational leaders and boards in making defensible PQC investment decisions under continuing uncertainty.