A general framework for defining security properties is presented. It allows us to model many traditional security properties as well as to define new ones. The framework is based on process algebras contexts and processes relations. By appropriate choice of both of them we can model also probabilistic and quantified security properties.
Process testing as a way to obtain information on confidential data is investigated. Our working formalism is based on an appropriate (probabilistic) process algebra and (probabilistic) testing. We define testing noninterference as well as sets of pr
Work supported by the grant VEGA 1/1333/12. A quantification of process’s security by differential privacy is defined and studied in the framework of probabilistic process algebras. The resulting (quantitative) security properties are investigated an
A formal model for diagnostics of biological systems modelled as P systems is presented. We assume the presence of some biologically motivated changes (frequently pathological) in the systems behavior and investigate when these changes could be diagnosed by an external observer by exploiting some techniques originally developed for reasoning on system security.